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THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN YOUNG ADULT 
SENTENCING AND  
MASS INCARCERATION 
JOSH GUPTA-KAGAN* 
 This Article connects two growing categories of academic literature 
and policy reform: arguments for treating young adults in the criminal 
justice system less severely than older adults because of evidence showing 
brain development and maturation continue until the mid-twenties; and 
arguments calling for reducing mass incarceration and identifying various 
mechanisms to do so. These categories overlap, but research has not 
previously built in-depth connections between the two. 
 Connecting the two bodies of literature helps identify and strengthen 
arguments for reform. First, changing charging, detention, and sentencing 
practices for young adults is one important tool to reduce mass 
incarceration. Young adults commit a disproportionate number of crimes. 
Because so many offenders are young adults, treating young adults less 
severely could have significant impacts on the number of individuals 
incarcerated. 
 Second, focusing on young adults responds to retributive arguments in 
defense of existing sentencing policies, especially for violent offenses. The 
mass incarceration literature shows that sentences for violent offenses 
explain much, if not most, of recent decades’ prison growth. Young adult 
violent offenders deserve punishment, but their youth mitigates their 
culpability and thus offers a response to retributive calls for long sentences. 
 Third, considering mass incarceration can add both urgency and new 
ideas to the growing debate about reforming sentencing of young adults. 
Such reforms have thus far been tentative, following well-grounded desires 
to test different alternative interventions for young adults. The mass 
incarceration literature adds an important consideration—the status quo 
demands prompt and far-reaching reform—and new ideas, such as 
prosecutorial charging guidelines that encompass defendants’ age. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article connects two growing categories of academic 
literature and policy reform—arguments for treating young adults (those 
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18–24 years old)1 in the criminal justice system less severely than older 
adults, and arguments calling for reducing mass incarceration and 
identifying various mechanisms to do so. Connecting the two bodies of 
literature provides important benefits to both. It adds an important 
policy reason—reducing mass incarceration—to calls for reforming 
treatment of young adult offenders. It provides one crucial argument for 
reducing the frequency and length of incarceration for violent offenses 
committed by young adults—a topic which the mass incarceration 
literature shows must be addressed to fight mass incarceration 
effectively. 
The young adult sentencing literature begins with well-established 
justifications for treating children differently than adults: they are 
developmentally less mature, more impulsive, more susceptible to 
various external pressures, and have reduced decision-making abilities. 
As a result, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly explained, retribution 
is less appropriate for them, deterrence is less effective, and 
rehabilitation is more effective. 
These basic principles apply to young adult offenders—albeit with 
lesser force—because neurological and psychological development 
continues past age 18 and into the mid-20s. As the Court has noted, 
drawing a line at 18 comes from history and the social meaning of age, 
not developmental psychology.2 The law’s present treatment of young 
adults the same as older adults, therefore, exists in tension with the 
developmental evidence. 
A growing literature seeks to reduce that tension and treat young 
adults differently, with some commentators calling for states to raise 
juvenile court jurisdiction above 18 and others to treat young adults 
 
 1.  The lower boundary of this age range comports with states’ typical age of 
majority and upper line of juvenile court jurisdiction, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
line for capital punishment eligibility. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005). 
Jeffrey Jensen Arnett coined the term “emerging adulthood” to refer to individuals 18–
25 years old. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development 
from the Late Teens Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469, 469 (2000). 
The 18–24 year old range used in this article finds support in the developmental 
science, and is frequently used in the legal and policy literature. E.g., COUNCIL OF 
STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., REDUCING RECIDIVISM AND IMPROVING OTHER OUTCOMES 
FOR YOUNG ADULTS IN THE JUVENILE AND ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 1, (2015) 
[hereinafter REDUCING RECIDIVISM], https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/11/Transitional-Age-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT4H-QJ2L]; 
LAURENCE STEINBERG ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PSYCHOSOCIAL MATURITY AND 
DESISTANCE FROM CRIME IN A SAMPLE OF SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS 1 (2015), 
https://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/248391.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3XX-PAAV]. Whether to 
draw a line at age 24 or 25 is beyond the scope of this Article.  
 2.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 (“The age of 18 is the point where society draws 
the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the 
age at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.”). 
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more leniently in the adult criminal system. This debate, like the child 
sentencing cases out of which it grows, begins with two foundational 
principles. First, young adults are presumptively different than older 
adults. Second, those differences apply regardless of the crime an 
individual may have committed—so if the law offers greater leniency to 
20-year-olds who commit non-violent offenses than to older adults, no 
principled reasons justify denying analogous leniency to 20-year-olds 
who commit violent offenses.3 
Separately, the mass incarceration literature has bemoaned the 
tremendously large number of people that the American criminal justice 
system incarcerates, both at any given point in time and over the course 
of lifetimes. This literature has noted the age distribution of individuals 
impacted by the criminal justice system—because crime is 
disproportionately a young person’s activity, young adults are 
particularly affected by the criminal justice system. More precisely, 
given the racial disparities highlighted in the mass incarceration 
literature, young black men are particularly affected by our criminal 
justice system’s treatment of young adults. Yet efforts to reform mass 
incarceration have not generally focused on offenders’ age and have 
instead focused on the categories of offenses—calling for less frequent 
incarceration for non-violent offenses, probation, and parole violations. 
To the extent the literature examines offenders’ age, it is usually on the 
back end, noting that there is little incapacitation benefit to 
incarcerating people who have aged enough to be a low risk for 
recidivism, rather than asking if young adults are less deserving of long 
sentences at the front end. 
Despite their overlaps, these two bodies of literature thus far 
largely developed in parallel. This Article seeks to connect them, and 
makes several preliminary claims about the value of analyzing young 
adult sentencing and mass incarceration together. First, changing 
charging, detention, and sentencing practices for young adults is one 
important tool to reduce mass incarceration. Crime of all kinds rises 
during adolescence, peaks in the late teens, and then declines 
precipitously to age 25, and then more gradually as individuals age, 
creating a bell-shaped graph known as the age-crime curve.4 This well-
 
 3.  This does not mean young adults should not face stiffer punishment for 
more severe crimes, only that if young adults should face more lenient sentences than 
older adults for less severe crimes, then the same should be true for more severe 
crimes. 
 4.  The age-crime curve is well-established and “is universal in Western 
populations.” NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, FROM JUVENILE DELINQUENCY TO YOUNG 
ADULT OFFENDING (2014) [hereinafter FROM JUVENILE DELINQUENCY], 
https://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/ 
Pages/delinquency-to-adult-offending.aspx [https://perma.cc/R8QD-6KZ4].  
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established part of the criminology literature reflects the developmental 
science regarding childhood and young adulthood—crime declines as 
people age through their twenties because they mature, become less 
impulsive, and can make better decisions under stress. And because so 
many offenders are young adults, treating young adults less severely 
could have significant impacts on the number of individuals 
incarcerated. 
Second, focusing on young adults responds to retributive 
arguments in defense of existing sentencing policies and provides an 
important argument for less severe punishment of young violent 
offenders. The mass incarceration literature has focused on aggregate 
incarceration numbers, and the large and varied costs of that 
incarceration. In addition, that literature establishes that while much 
policy reform has focused on decreasing incarceration for non-violent 
offenses, the sheer number of individuals incarcerated for violent 
crimes means that we must address sentences for violent crimes to 
address mass incarceration comprehensively.5 But this literature 
addresses less directly the retributive beliefs which contribute to mass 
incarceration—that individuals who commit violent offenses, in 
particular, deserve prison time, often long prison time. Young adult 
violent offenders deserve punishment, but their youth mitigates their 
culpability and thus the retribution proportionate to their offense. 
Third, considering mass incarceration can add both urgency and 
new ideas to the growing debate about reforming sentencing of young 
adults. Such reforms have thus far been tentative, following well-
grounded desires to test different alternative interventions for young 
adults. The mass incarceration literature adds an important 
consideration—the status quo of mass incarceration demands prompt 
and far-reaching reform. Moreover, this point extends the reasons for a 
categorical prohibition on executing children (and a near-categorical 
prohibition on sentencing children to die in prison)—we cannot 
determine which individual children or young adults may warrant full 
adult sanctions, so some kind of categorically more lenient treatment of 
young adults is necessary. Only a categorical rule could have a strong 
enough effect on incarceration trends to contribute meaningfully to 
mass incarceration significantly. And ideas from the mass incarceration 
literature—such as establishing prosecutorial charging guidelines—can 
be adapted to incorporate young adult offenders’ age. 
Finally, empirical research should work to identify and evaluate 
programs which can serve as alternatives to incarceration for young 
 
 5.  For instance, the United States could release all non-violent offenders and 
still imprison three times more people than it did in decades past. Infra note 222 and 
accompanying text. 
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adults, and focus on young adults as a distinct age group when 
considering mass incarceration. 
Part I will review the emerging literature regarding young adults 
who commit crimes, and why that population can make a valid claim 
that the same details which mitigate children’s offenses should (more 
modestly) mitigate their offenses. Part I will also explore different 
proposals for taking young adults’ age into account when considering 
their sentences, and explain why a categorical approach is preferable to 
the existing case-by-case approaches. Part II will review the literature 
regarding mass incarceration, and how that literature establishes that 
sentences of young adults, including for violent crime, is an important 
contributor to America’s high incarceration rates. Yet that literature has 
not featured age as prominently as the emerging discussion of young 
adult sentencing would suggest. Part III connects the two bodies of 
literature, and explores how each can strengthen arguments made by 
the other. 
I. SENTENCING YOUNG ADULTS 
Relying on developmental science, the Supreme Court has now 
repeatedly held that “children are different” and thus enjoy 
constitutional protections against the most severe punishments.6 The 
Court focused these repeated holdings on children under 18, drawing a 
line at that age in Roper v. Simmons.7 But the Court was clear that this 
line depended not only on the developmental literature which informed 
other parts of its holdings.8 Rather, Roper’s line at age 18 depends on 
the social, cultural, and legal meaning assigned to that age.9 
The Supreme Court’s reliance on developmental research begs the 
question of why treat only children under 18 differently. In the dozen 
years since Roper, scholars and advocates have begun questioning the 
line drawn at age 18, especially in light of research showing that the 
brain continues to develop—and, in particular, portions of the brain 
which enhance executive function and decision-making capabilities—
until age 25.10 The gradual development that continues past teenagers’ 
18th birthdays suggest better policy11 is to provide gradual sentencing 
 
 6.  Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 481 (2012); see also id. at 471 
(“[C]hildren are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.”); 
infra Section I.A.1 (discussing quartet of Supreme Court cases). 
 7.  543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005). 
8.  Id. at 569–74.  
 9.  Id. at 574. 
10.  See infra Sections I.A.1 & I.C. 
 11.  In this Article, I focus on policy arguments rather than constitutional 
arguments. That is, I explore how developmental psychology research—adopted into 
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change after turning 18 rather than the bright line at 18 that currently 
exists—and this idea has begun to get traction in both academic and 
policy circles. 
This Part explores the Supreme Court’s children’s sentencing cases 
and its age line at 18, the reasons to question a bright line at 18, 
various ways legal developments have already started to question that 
line, and competing proposals to treat young adults differently for 
criminal sentencing purposes. This Part will also address a central 
question in both the child sentencing cases and in designing young adult 
sentencing policies—is a categorical or a case-by-case approach 
preferable? Put more precisely, should the law apply young adult 
sentencing to all individuals of a certain age, or only when some 
individualized circumstances are present? The Supreme Court has been 
conflicted on this question for child sentencing, and proposals for 
young adult sentencing are similarly split. This Part will explore the 
few states that permit a case-by-case approach to young adult 
sentencing and argue that they show how such an approach fails to 
account for young adults’ developmental status effectively—at least 
under existing, narrowly-drawn statutes. Relatedly, this Part will 
discuss empirical literature demonstrating how current law permits 
young adults to face disproportionately more severe sentences—a 
phenomenon which emphasizes the need for a different approach to 
spark more dramatic reforms. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Quartet: Reduced 
Sentences for Crimes Committed by Children Under 18 
In a quartet of Eighth Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has 
limited constitutionally-permissible punishments for crimes committed 
by children under 18—it has banned capital punishment,12 life without 
the possibility of parole for non-homicide crimes,13 and the mandatory 
application of life without the possibility of parole for homicides.14 
Most recently, it applied that ban on mandatory life sentences 
retroactively, clarifying that the Court has substantively banned life 
without the possibility of parole “for all but the rarest of juvenile 
 
constitutional law and helpfully articulated in legal terms by the Supreme Court—can 
justify broader reforms. Whether such arguments should justify expansions of the Roper 
protections to offenders above age 18, see infra notes 69–70, or whether the Court will 
(or should) hesitate to expand Eighth Amendment protections is beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
 12.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. 
 13.  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). 
 14.  Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012). 
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offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.”15 
These cases often use broad language—describing children as always 
different, regardless of the crime committed,16 suggesting that 
sentencing courts should always punish children differently than adults. 
The Supreme Court’s holdings and subsequent policy 
developments rest in large part on psychological and neurological 
literature showing that children really are different—in particular, that 
they make decisions to participate in crime differently than adults do.17 
As a result of those differences, the Supreme Court found that various 
theories of punishment operate differently with children—they are less 
culpable and so retribution is less appropriate, they are less subject to 
deterrence, and more subject to rehabilitation, and thus lifelong 
incapacitation is less warranted.18 
1. DEVELOPMENTAL REASONS FOR TREATING CHILDREN—AND 
YOUNG ADULTS—DIFFERENTLY 
The Court rested its Eighth Amendment holdings on its 
understanding of developmental psychology—that because 16- and 17-
year-old children were still developing, they were insufficiently 
culpable to warrant the death penalty and, in all but the most extreme 
cases, life sentences without the possibility of parole. The Court’s first 
decision—banning the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons—
rested on three developmental principles, repeated through the later 
cases of the quartet. Crucially for this Article, each of these factors 
continues for young adults.19 
First, adolescents are less mature and have an “underdeveloped 
sense of responsibility,” leading teenagers to engage in a range of risky 
behaviors, including crime.20 The lack of maturity leads teenagers to 
 
 15.  Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734, 736 (2016). 
 16.  Miller, 567 U.S. at 473. 
 17.  Indeed, the Court’s reliance on developmental evidence represents a shift 
from prior decisions. Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Science and Juvenile 
Justice Policymaking, 23 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 410, 413 (2017). 
18.  Id.  
 19.  See, e.g., Kelsey B. Shust, Comment, Extending Sentencing Mitigation 
for Deserving Young Adults, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 667, 684–89 (2014) 
(summarizing developmental data suggesting young adults over 18 are similar to 
adolescents under 18). 
 20.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 
509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
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exhibit poor self-control, over-value short-term rewards, and under-
value the long-term costs to themselves and others.21 
These same descriptions apply to older adolescents and young 
adults in their early twenties.22 Studies measuring individuals’ self-
control found that under more stressful conditions,23 young adults 
perform more like adolescents than older adults.24 Individuals’ future-
orientation—their ability to balance long-term consequences with more 
immediate effects—gradually grows “over an extended period between 
childhood and young adulthood.”25 
While quantifying the maturation that occurs between turning 18 
and 25 is difficult, psychological and neurological research shows that 
“[b]iological changes in the prefontal cortex during adolescence and the 
early 20s lead to improvements in executive functioning, including 
reasoning, abstract thinking, planning, anticipating consequences, and 
impulse control.”26 Graphically, scholars have represented this 
development by drawing a line for intellectual maturity—individuals’ 
ability to reason—and a line for psychosocial maturity—the ability to 
make decisions which account for short and long-term risks and 
benefits accurately.27 While intellectual maturity reaches its peak and 
levels off around age fifteen, the psychosocial maturity line does not 
reach that level until about age 25.28 The resulting gap—labeled “the 
immaturity gap” in one influential summary of the research—remains 
large at age 18 and continues until the two lines meet at age 25.29 
Second, the Supreme Court concluded that “juveniles are more 
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, 
 
 21.  Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of 
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile 
Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1012 (2003).  
 22.  Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal 
Category: Science, Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 647 
(2016). 
 23.  Stressful conditions are considered analogous to situations in which an 
individual decides whether to commit a crime. Steinberg & Scott, supra note 21, at 
1014. 
 24.  Scott et al., supra note 22, at 650. Absent the stressors imposed during 
the experiment, young adults performed better than adolescents. Id. 
 25.  Steinberg & Scott, supra note 21, at 1012. 
 26.  David P. Farrington et al., Young Adult Offenders: The Need for More 
Effective Legislative Options and Justice Processing, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 
729, 733 (2012). 
 27.  MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEV. & JUVENILE 
JUSTICE, LESS GUILTY BY REASON OF ADOLESCENCE 2 (2006), http://www.adjj.org/ 
downloads/6093issue_brief_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/XHB9-2VUD].  
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
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including peer pressure.”30 In part, this is because, as children, they 
have less control over their environment, including less ability to 
extricate themselves from their environment.31 That factor changes 
legally at age 18, though one may reasonably question how much that 
changes practically, especially for individuals who lack resources. 
Teenagers are also more susceptible to outside influences because they 
over-value short-term rewards, especially peer approval.32 
Although not all psychological studies reach the same conclusion, 
multiple psychological studies show similar factors continuing into 
young adulthood.33 
Third, an adolescent’s character “is not as well formed as that of 
an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less 
fixed.”34 The psychological literature describing the period between 
turning 18 and 25 as “emerging adulthood” asserts that “identity 
development continues through the late teens and the twenties.”35 
Others are open to that conclusion, but caution that the research may be 
ambiguous—some studies have found that it continues to be 
“transitory” into young adulthood, while others suggest it is more 
stable.36 
Beyond that psychological debate, crime data has long made clear 
that young adult crime does not define offenders, but rather is “a 
transitory state that they age out of.”37 This is reflected in age-crime 
curves—graphs with offenders’ age on the x-axis and crime rates on the 
y-axis, and which show that crime rates peak in the late teens and 
remain high in the early twenties and then drop precipitously around the 
mid-twenties.38 As the National Institute of Justice has noted, a majority 
(52–57 percent) of juvenile offenders continue offending “up to age 
25,” but this figure plummets by two-thirds in the following five 
years.39 As a result of committing a disproportionate number of 
crimes,40 young adults make up a disproportionate number of 
admissions to prison systems. In California, for instance, twenty-six 
 
 30.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
 31.  Id. (citing Steinberg & Scott, supra note 21, at 1014). 
 32.  Steinberg & Scott, supra note 21, at 1012. 
 33.  Scott et al., supra note 22, at 649. 
 34.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. 
 35.  Arnett, supra note 1, at 473. 
 36.  Scott et al., supra note 22, at 649–50. 
 37.  JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION 
AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 190–91 (2017).  
38.  FROM JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 4. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  This is particularly so for violent crime. See infra notes 301–304 and 
accompanying text. 
2018:669 Young Adult Sentencing & Mass Incarceration 679 
 
percent of all new felony admissions to the state prison system are of 18 
to 24-year-olds.41 
The age-crime curves make clear that for most young adults who 
commit crimes, as with most children who commit crimes, crime is 
“transitory” and not a “fixed” character trait.42 Desistance from crime 
is particularly frequent in these young adult years, which account for 
“the highest concentration of desistance” of any age band.43 The 
Council of State Governments has observed that the concentration of 
crime, especially violent crimes, committed by young adults is “[n]ot 
coincidental[]” given all the ongoing neurological and psychological 
development.44 Consistent with that view, other risky behaviors—
unprotected sex, binge drinking and other forms of substance use, and 
risky driving—peak between ages 18 and 25.45 
When the Court revisited juvenile sentencing questions in cases 
following Roper, it heard from multiple experts who made clear that the 
three principles applied to young adults. Amicus briefs summarized 
research, explaining that development continues past age 18 and into 
 
 41.  CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CHARACTERISTICS OF FELON NEW 
ADMISSIONS AND PAROLE VIOLATORS RETURNED WITH A NEW TERM: CALENDAR YEAR 
2013, at 17 (2014), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_ 
Information_Services_Branch/Annual/ACHAR1/ACHAR1d2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TDP5-AG9T]. If anything, this figure understates the number of 
young adults entering prison every year. The state agency reports new inmates based on 
their age when admitted to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, not their 
age at the time of offense. Id. at 34. So, some proportion of the 25–29-year-olds who 
entered state custody (accounting for 17.5 percent of new inmates) were incarcerated 
for crimes committed in their younger twenties. Id. at 17. California reports similar 
proportions in earlier years. See Characteristics of Felon Admissions to Prison Report 
Archive, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/An
nual/Achar1Archive.html [https://perma.cc/5SN9-6W64].  
 42.  The Court used these terms in Roper. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 570 (2005). 
 43.  Farrington et al., supra note 26, at 734. 
 44.  REDUCING RECIDIVISM, supra note 1, at 1. 
 45.  Arnett, supra note 1, at 474–75. Recognizing young adults’ risky driving, 
car rental companies either prohibit them from renting cars or charge extra. See, e.g., 
Renting a Car Under 25, ALAMO, https://www.alamo.com/en_US/car-rental/age-
requirements.html [https://perma.cc/6GAG-SJ6K] (noting that it will not rent cars to 
most individuals under 21, and that “rental rates may be higher for renters between the 
ages of 21 and 24”); Car Rental for 20–24 Year Olds, DOLLAR, 
https://www.dollar.com/TravelCenter/TravelTools/under_25.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/98DD-59S3] (“Renters under 25 years old are subject to a Young 
Renter Fee.”); Restrictions and Surcharges for Renters Under 25 Years of Age, 
BUDGET, https://www.budget.com/budgetWeb/html/en/common/agePopUp.html 
[https://perma.cc/D543-GN99] (noting a general minimum rental age of 25, and listing 
surcharges for exceptions to that rule). 
680 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
 
young adulthood,46 human brains are not “fully mature until an 
individual reaches his or her twenties,” and, in particular, portions of 
the brain which improve decision-making and help control impulses do 
not fully develop until then.47 
The Supreme Court drew a legal inference from the developmental 
literature it relied upon—“the distinctive attributes of youth diminish 
the penological justifications” for punishment.48 Youth are less 
blameworthy, so retribution is less appropriate.49 Youth are less likely 
to consider the consequences of their actions, including possible 
punishment, so deterrence is less effective.50 The circumstances of 
youth “most suggest” the value of rehabilitation,51 and render 
incapacitation (at least through lifetime sentences) suspect.52 Because 
the developmental literature applies to young adults as well, these same 
inferences should as well. 
2. THE SUPREME COURT’S AGE LINE AT 18 
In the context of the Court’s prior opinions, Roper pushed the age 
line up from 16 to 18.53 In doing so the Court’s opinion “speaks in the 
language and with the authority of the developmental psychologists 
whose writings are the only sources cited for all three of the differences 
identified,”54 but it rested its age line at 18 on the legal and social 
meaning of age:  
Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to 
the objections always raised against categorical rules. The 
qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not 
disappear when an individual turns 18. . . . [H]owever, a line 
must be drawn. . . . The age of 18 is the point where society 
draws the line for many purposes between childhood and 
 
 46.  Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 5, 9, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 
10-9647). 
 47.  Brief for J. Lawrence Aber et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners 
at 15–16, Miller, 567 U.S. 460 (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647). 
 48.  Miller, 567 U.S. at 472. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 478. 
 52.  Id. at 472. 
 53.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 
487 U.S. 815, 815 (1988) (drawing the line at age 16). 
 54.  Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child 
Development Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 36 (2009). 
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adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line for 
death eligibility ought to rest.55 
Roper’s line at age 18—and the Court’s abrupt shift from 
developmental authorities to “where society draws the line”56—has 
engendered criticism. Emily Buss labels it “particularly troubling, 
because age eighteen may not even be the right place to draw the line 
for the most typical child.”57 Indeed, young adults have a similar claim 
that their developmental status means that the best policy is to sentence 
them differently than older adults. Psychologists have suggested that 
the years between 18 and 25 are not full adulthood, but “emerging 
adulthood.”58 There are surely social and cultural elements in this 
concept—it emerged after the median age for marriage and parenthood 
pushed into the late twenties, and as a majority of Americans attended 
at least some college, pushing education into the twenties.59 Emerging 
adult is thus analogized to adolescence, which has social and cultural, 
in addition to developmental, meaning.60 The social meaning of 
emerging adulthood as a distinct status coupled with strong evidence 
showing that development continues until age 25 provides a solid 
foundation for policy reforms regarding young adults in the criminal 
justice system. 
Roper’s focus on the social basis for drawing an age line at 18 also 
helps explain its reliance on international law’s condemnation of the 
juvenile death penalty, which reveals a global consensus of the meaning 
of a line at 18.61 The Court found that international law “confirm[s]” 
that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for a child.62 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child codifies that global social 
and legal norm, defining children as under 18 and prohibiting capital 
punishment of children.63 Commentators have confirmed the 
understanding that the constitutional line at 18 is, at best, “interpreting 
 
 55.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 (2005) (emphasis added). 
56.  Id.  
 57.  Buss, supra note 54, at 39. Buss warns that failing to match the Court’s 
age line to the developmental research undermines its reliance on developmental 
research. Id. 
 58.  Arnett, supra note 1, at 469. 
 59.  Id.  
 60.  Arnett makes this point explicitly: “Like adolescence, emerging 
adulthood is a period of the life course that is culturally constructed, not universal and 
immutable.” Id. at 470 (emphasis added). 
 61.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 575–78. 
 62.  Id. at 575. 
 63.  United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 1 & 37(a), 
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) (cited in Roper, 
543 U.S. at 576). 
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the science to fit our social and legal reality, one in which we’ve 
decided to regard 18 as an important turning point.”64 
The Court has avoided further consideration of the age line at 18 it 
drew in Roper. In each of the subsequent cases of the quartet, the Court 
reaffirmed Roper’s three developmental points.65 In Graham v. 
Florida66, Justice Kennedy’s opinion even noted that the science had 
gotten stronger and acknowledged that development continued into “late 
adolescence.”67 But all of the defendants had committed crimes when 
they were under 18, so the Court had no reason to address evidence 
showing similar developmental features for young adults. 
B. Expanding Legal Provisions Regarding Young Adults 
Treating young adults who commit crimes less severely than older 
adults would represent a dramatic change in our criminal justice 
system. Nonetheless, criminal law, and the law more broadly, has 
increasingly treated young adulthood as a distinct category in recent 
years. Such efforts have thus far been relatively small, and certainly not 
universal in scope or consistent in application.68 More dramatic reform 
proposals are discussed in Section I.C. The existing trend towards 
treating young adulthood as a distinct category provides important 
context for those proposals and demonstrates that they are not far-
fetched. 
Most directly connected to the Roper line of cases and evidence 
showing psychological and neurological development continues into the 
mid-twenties discussed in Section I.A., some litigation has begun 
questioning the age line drawn in Roper at 18. Experts have testified in 
death penalty cases that “if a different version of Roper were heard 
 
 64.  Terry A. Maroney, The Once and Future Juvenile Brain, in CHOOSING 
THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 189, 206 (Franklin E. Zimring & David 
S. Tanenhaus eds., 2014). 
 65.  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 
U.S. 460, 471–72 (2012); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016). 
66.  560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 67.  Id. at 68.  
 68.  Efforts in the United Kingdom have been described similarly. The House 
of Commons Justice Committee has noted “an emerging interest in criminal justice 
agencies in treating young adults more appropriately,” but also described the absence of 
clear policy and legislation leading “the distinct needs of young adults . . . [to be] 
largely overlooked and at best treated inconsistently.” HOUSE OF COMMONS JUSTICE 
COMMITTEE, HC 169, THE TREATMENT OF YOUNG ADULTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM, SEVENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2016–17, ¶ 52 (2016) [hereinafter TREATMENT 
OF YOUNG ADULTS], 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmjust/169/169.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y83Z-9BQK]. 
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today, knowing what we know now, one could’ve made the very same 
arguments about eighteen (18), nineteen (19), and twenty (20) year olds 
that were made about sixteen (16) and seventeen (17) year olds in 
Roper.”69 One trial court has declared the death penalty unconstitutional 
as applied to individuals under 21, explaining that “[i]f the science in 
2005 mandated the ruling in Roper, the science in 2017 mandates this 
ruling.”70 Scholars have similarly argued for the abolition of capital 
punishment and life without parole sentences for young adult 
offenders.71 
Broader trends seek to treat a larger group of young adult 
offenders as a distinct category. Some criminal sentencing laws have 
long treated young adults differently than older adults. Several states 
have youthful offender statutes, which mitigate sentences for certain 
crimes up to age 25, and, somewhat like the juvenile justice system, 
shield young adults from some of the collateral consequences of adult 
convictions and provide a range of rehabilitative services.72 In recent 
years, two states—Colorado and Vermont—have expanded their 
youthful offender statutes to include more young adults.73 Scholars have 
advocated expanding these statutes by making them presumptively 
applicable to some young adults.74 
A growing number of jurisdictions have developed court 
procedures and programs to treat young adult offenders differently. A 
2016 survey by the U.S. Department of Justice identified fifty-six 
 
 69.  Kentucky v. Bredhold, No. 14-CR-161, at 2 (Fayette Cir. Ct. Aug. 1, 
2017) (quoting testimony of Dr. Laurence Steinberg), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
files/pdf/TravisBredholdKentuckyOrderExtendingRopervSimmons.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9HG4-6MYN].  
 70.  Id. at 6. The State filed an appeal of this ruling. Kentucky v. Bredhold, 
Motion to Stay Proceedings, 2017 WL 8895509 (2017). As of October 9, 2018, no 
appellate decision had issued. 
 71.  ROLF LOEBER, DAVID P. FARRINGTON & DAVID PETECHUK, BULLETIN 1: 
FROM JUVENILE DELINQUENCY TO YOUNG ADULT OFFENDING (STUDY GROUP ON THE 
TRANSITIONS BETWEEN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND ADULT CRIME) 22 (2013); 
Farrington et al., supra note 26, at 743. 
 72.  Scott et al., supra note 22, at 660–61. E.g., D.C. CODE §§ 24-901 to -
907 (West 2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-7-1 to -9 (West 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 762.11–.13 (West 2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-19-5 to -160 (West 2018); W. VA. 
CODE § 25-4-1 to -12 (West 2018). 
 73.  Colorado expanded its youthful offender statute, which previously only 
included children tried as adults, to include 18- and 19-year-olds. 2009 Colo. Legis. 
Serv. 278–79 (West 2018) (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-407.5 (2013)). For a 
brief discussion of Colorado’s program, see infra notes 341–343 and accompanying 
text. Vermont’s legislature expanded youthful offender status to include individuals 
under 22-years-old at the time of the offense. 2016 Vt. Acts & Resolves, No. 153 
§§ 1–2 (codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5280 (2018)). These provisions took 
effect on July 1, 2018. Id. at § 39(c). 
 74.  Scott et al., supra note 22, at 660–61. 
684 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
 
programs or networks or programs across the country.75 Those 
programs included six “young adult courts” modeled after drug courts 
or juvenile courts.76 These courts arose in geographically and politically 
diverse jurisdictions—including Manhattan and San Francisco, but also 
Idaho Falls, Idaho; Omaha, Nebraska; Kalamazoo, Michigan; and 
Lockport, New York.77 All are relatively recent innovations, with most 
established since 2010.78 Longer lists of probation departments and 
prosecutors’ offices have established distinct units to work with young 
adults both pre-trial and post-adjudication.79 As with young adult 
courts, the majority of these programs were established since 2010.80 
Prison systems have also begun treating young adults differently 
than older inmates. Some commentators have called for “special 
correctional facilities for young adult offenders” with a variety of 
rehabilitative programs.81 The growing attention to the problems of 
solitary confinement also reflects a growing recognition of young 
adulthood as a distinct category. The U.S. Department of Justice issued 
guidelines describing sharply limited use of “restrictive housing” for 
children.82 DOJ simultaneously identified 18–24-year-olds as their own 
category, distinct both from older adults and “less so, from 
adolescence,”83 and noted its development of services for young adult 
inmates designed to prevent disciplinary incidents which lead to the use 
of restrictive housing.84 Other jurisdictions have gone further. Faced 
with a critical U.S. Attorney’s investigation into the use of punitive 
solitary confinement on adolescents,85 New York City authorities 
 
 75.  CONNIE HAYEK, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, ENVIRONMENTAL SCAN OF 
DEVELOPMENTALLY APPROPRIATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSES TO JUSTICE-INVOLVED 
YOUNG ADULTS 6 (2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/2499 
02.pdf [https://perma.cc/PUC5-8Z3E]. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 24–29. 
 78.  Id. 
79.  Id. at 30–47.  
 80.  Id. at 30–47. 
 81.  Farrington et al., supra note 26, at 742–43. 
 82.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING 
THE USE OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING 61–62 (2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/815551/download [https://perma.cc/E5VH-
Y4D6].  
 83.  Id. at 59. 
 84.  Id. at 60. 
 85.  Letter from Preet Bhara, U.S. Attorney, S.D.N.Y., to Bill de Blasio, 
Mayor, New York City, Joseph Ponte, Comm’r, New York City, Zachary Carter, 
Corp. Counsel, New York City (Aug. 4, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-
sdny/legacy/2015/03/25/SDNY%20Rikers%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3BF-
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determined to stop the practice of solitary confinement for all inmates 
21 and younger.86 The decision to ban solitary confinement for young 
adults (and not only children) was based in part on developmental 
psychology showing brain development past age 18,87 and 
commentators have begun challenging solitary confinement for anyone 
under 15.88 
State and local governments have also begun experimenting with 
various programs and facilities specifically for young adult offenders,89 
something the Department of Justice recommended in 2014.90 These 
programs and facilities seek to apply lessons from juvenile justice 
programs and facilities.91 In at least one instance, a state has repurposed 
a juvenile prison for young adults.92 Such efforts have critics who argue 
that appealing descriptions of young adult prisons will lead states to 
increase the number of young adults incarcerated;93 they nonetheless 
 
Q89J] (regarding CRIPA Investigation of the New York City Department of Correction 
Jails on Rikers Island).  
 86.  Michel Winerip & Michael Schwirtz, Rikers to Ban Isolation for Inmates 




 87.  Jessica Lee, Lonely Too Long: Redefining and Reforming Juvenile 
Solitary Confinement, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 845, 847 (2016) (arguing that “the effects 
of solitary confinement are just as damaging for young adults as they are for 
juveniles”). 
 88.  Id. at 848; Deema Nagib, Jail Isolation After Kingsley: Abolishing 
Solitary Confinement at the Intersection of Pretrial Incarceration and Emerging 
Adulthood, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2915, 2945 (2017). 
 89.  Scott et al., supra note 22, at 663–64; see also Maureen Washburn, 
Young Adult Prison Movement Deepens Reliance on Incarceration, Shortchanges 





c65c3606-124960533 [https://perma.cc/AHA3-D5CB].  
 90.  Young Offenders: What Happens and What Should Happen, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUST. OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS Feb. 2014, at 2 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/242653.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN5L-PMJQ] 
(recommending states “[c]onsider creating special correctional facilities for young adult 
offenders”). 
 91.  Scott et al., supra note 22, at 663–64. 
 92.  Caitlin Burchill, Charleston Youth Correctional Facility Transitioning to 
Specialized Facility for Adult Inmates, WABI5 (Aug. 4, 2015) (describing shifting a 
juvenile prison to an adult prison, in part to “expand[] the young adult offender 
program for inmates 18 through 26-year[s]-old”). 
 93.  Washburn, supra note 89. 
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demonstrate the trend toward treating young adults as a distinct 
category. 
Simultaneous legal developments beyond criminal law also reflect 
the increased recognition that children continue to develop into their 
mid-20s, and the decreased social meaning of turning 18. In 2008, 
Congress enacted legislation to support state efforts to extend foster 
care from age 18 to age 21, recognizing that 18-year-olds are unlikely 
to be able to support themselves effectively on their own.94 More than 
half of all states now provide some kind of foster care past age 18.95 In 
2018, Congress expanded these provisions to support state efforts to 
provide independent living services to former foster youth until age 23, 
and education and vocational training assistance until age 26.96 In 2009, 
Congress prevented credit card companies from contracting with 
anyone below age 21 without someone 21 or older co-signing.97 In 
2010, Congress ensured that young adults could remain on their 
parents’ health insurance until turning 26.98 In 2015, Texas raised the 
age at which an individual who has not graduated high school may drop 
out to 19.99 States have expanded the scope of child support obligations 
past age 18,100 especially for young adults who are attending college or 
who have a disability, with some calls to broaden this coverage to 
 
 94.  Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-351, § 201 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 675(8)(B) (2018)). 
 95.  The Center for the Study of Social Policy lists twenty-three states plus the 
District of Columbia as having “extended” foster care. STATES WITH EXTENDED FOSTER 
CARE, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, 
http://www.cssp.org/policy/2016/STATEs-with-extended-foster-care-MAP.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B6K5-67ML]. Some states not listed on that map have also extended 
foster care past age 18. FLA. STAT. § 39.013(2) (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-48(c) 
(2017). Many of these states treat the years after turning 18 as transitional by, for 
instance, giving 18–20-year-olds the choice to remain in foster care. FLA. STAT. 
§ 39.013(2)(a)–(b) (2017). 
 96.  Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Family First Prevention Services Act, 
Pub. L. No. 115-123, § 50753(a) & (c)(1)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 677(b)(3)(A) 
(2012)). 
 97.  Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 301(c)(8)(B)(i) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)(8) (2012)). 
 98.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 2714(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-14(a) (2012)). This provision is one of a 
short list which conservative health care legislation did not seek to repeal in the 
American Health Care Act of 2017. See H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017) 
(contains no change to 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-14).  
 99.  TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.085(b) (West 2018). 
 100.  E.g., 2002 Conn. Legis. Serv. 02-128 (West), An Act Concerning 
Educational Support Orders (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b–56c(a) (2015)); Anna 
Stępień-Sporek & Margaret Ryznar, Child Support for Adult Children, 30 QUINNIPIAC 
L. REV. 359, 364–68 (2012) (describing several states’ post-18 child support law). 
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young adults more generally.101 In the wake of the February 2018 
Parkland, Florida, school shooting, the Florida and Vermont 
legislatures prohibited the sale of a firearm to anyone under 21,102 and 
such age limits on young adult gun purchases were one of the few 
proposals to gain bipartisan traction to ban purchasing firearms below 
the age of 21.103 
These developments followed other longer-standing laws that 
recognize the ongoing development past age 18 to full adulthood. The 
drinking age is generally 21.104 The Higher Education Act requires 
applicants for federal financial aid to report their parents’ income—
expecting that parents will continue to support their children through 
college—until they turn 24.105 Some age lines well into adulthood date 
to the eighteenth century—the Constitution set a minimum age of 25 for 
 
 101.  Sally F. Goldfarb, Who Pays for the “Boomerang Generation”?: A Legal 
Perspective on Financial Support for Young Adults, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 45, 86 
(2014). The case for expanding post-18 child support begins by noting that just as 
young adulthood is marked by a gradual psychological and neurological development, 
young adults have “prolonged financial dependency” in this period. Id. at 50. 
 102.  Fla. S.B. 7026, 2018 Leg., 2nd Sess., Marjory Stoneman Douglas High 
School Public Safety Act, § 11, (codified at FLA. STAT. § 790.065(13) (2018)); 2018 
Va. Acts No. 94, An act relating to the disposition of unlawful and abandoned 
firearms, § 7 (codified at 13 VER. STAT. ANN. § 4020 (2018)). The same day the 
Florida governor signed the Florida legislation, the National Rifle Association sued to 
declare the age restriction unconstitutionally infringes on 18–20-year-olds’ rights under 
the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. Complaint, Nat’l Rifle Ass’n. v. Bondi, No. 
4:18-cv-00137-MW-CAS (Mar. 9, 2018). The NRA alleges that “[a]t 18 years of age, 
law-abiding citizens in this country are considered adults for almost all purposes and 
certainly for the purposes of the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights.” Id. ¶ 3. 
 103.  Beyond Florida and Vermont, commentators of various political stripes 
and private gun-sellers have proposed laws or adopted policies that are similar or even 
broader. See, e.g., Julie Creswell & Michael Corkery, Walmart and Dick’s Raise 
Minimum Age for Gun Buyers to 21, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/business/walmart-and-dicks-major-gun-retailers-
will-tighten-rules-on-guns-they-sell.html; Ross Douthat, No Country for Young Men 
with AR-15s, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/opinion/sunday/no-country-for-young-men-with-
ar-15s.html (arguing for individuals’ right to obtain guns to be “staggered” through 
young adulthood with semiautomatic pistols banned until age 25 and semiautomatic 
rifles banned until age 30). While these proposals may serve as alternatives to further-
reaching gun control proposals, they also signify a recognition that age lines above 18 
are well justified. 
 104.  E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-6-4080 (2018) (criminalizing selling alcohol 
to individuals under 21); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-19-2450 (2018) (criminalizing purchase 
and possession of alcohol by individuals under 21). 
 105.  Federal law defines children 24 and older as “independent student[s].” 20 
U.S.C. § 1087vv(d)(1)(A) (2012). Parental income is only used to determine financial 
aid for dependent students; independent students need only report their own income and 
a spouse’s. 20 U.S.C. § 1087nn(b)(1) (2012).  
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members of the House of Representatives,106 30 for U.S. Senators,107 
and 35 for Presidents.108 
C. Applying Age-Based Mitigation to Young Adults 
Advocates and scholars have begun to consider the implications of 
Roper’s acknowledgement that “[t]he qualities that distinguish juveniles 
from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18,”109 and the 
developmental and neurological science showing that the factors which 
Roper found applicable to children also apply to young adults, as 
described in Section I.A.i. At whatever upper age one might draw a 
line,110 calls to change how the justice system responds to young adults 
who commit crimes have grown significantly in recent years. While 
some of these calls are dramatic, others seek relatively modest reforms 
to existing adult sentencing laws. 
A growing body of social science work supports the idea that 
young adults deserve less severe and more rehabilitative punishment 
than older adults. Developmental literature has convinced many 
scholars that young adults are “in many respects . . . more similar to 
 
 106.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 107.  U.S. CONST. art I, § 3. 
 108.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 109.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005). This advocacy and 
scholarship has not sought to extend Roper’s Eighth Amendment age line. Just as Roper 
increased the Eighth Amendment age line from 16 to 18, one might consider if a future 
Court might increase it yet higher—perhaps to 21, if the Court continues to look for a 
line with legal, social, and historical resonance. That said, a fuller Eighth Amendment 
argument is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 110.  No consistent age line exists in the literature. While age 25 is commonly 
used, some policy proposals focus on younger ages. Arnett, supra note 1, at 469–70, 
476–77; REDUCING RECIDIVISM, supra note 1; STEINBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 1, 8. 
Lael Chester and Vincent Schiraldi’s call to raise the age of juvenile court jurisdiction, 
for instance, would apply to young adults under 21. LAEL CHESTER & VINCENT 
SCHIRALDI, PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGING ADULTS IN CONNECTICUT: PROVIDING 
EFFECTIVE AND DEVELOPMENTALLY APPROPRIATE RESPONSES FOR YOUTH UNDER AGE 
21, at iv–v, 2 (2016), https://www.cga.ct.gov/app/tfs/ 
20141215_Juvenile Justice Policy and Oversight Committee/20170120/Public Safety 
Emerging Adults in Connecticut.pdf [https://perma.cc/FT9H-WY9U]. Elizabeth Scott 
et al.’s call for presumptive youthful offender status would apply to young adults under 
21. Scott et al., supra note 22, at 660–61. The developmental literature does show that 
brain development continues to age 25, but drawing a line for full criminal 
responsibility could logically come younger. For instance, one study noted by the U.S. 
Department of Justice shows that psychosocial maturity increases at about the same rate 
from age fourteen through age 22. Between 22 and 25, maturation continues, but more 
slowly. STEINBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 1, 8. Whether that study supports drawing a 
line at 22 or 25 or elsewhere is subject to debate, but that debate is beyond the scope of 
this Article.  
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juveniles than to adults,”111 or that purposes of punishment apply with 
“lesser or no force to youthful offenders.”112 This proposition has also 
been gaining acceptance in other countries.113 Scholars have also noted 
the reduced salience of turning 18, which “no longer marks the 
assumption of mature adult roles.”114 
The most dramatic application of the Roper line of cases to young 
adults has been in calls to raise the age of juvenile court jurisdiction 
from 18 to 21. As of this writing, only one state, Vermont, has 
expanded juvenile court jurisdiction to include those 18 and older.115 
Bills in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Florida, and Illinois would raise 
the age to 21116 and are supported by arguments that the same factors 
which render children under 18 less culpable for crime and more 
susceptible to rehabilitative efforts apply to young adults into their mid-
twenties.117 Like younger adolescents, these “[e]merging adults are 
more volatile in emotionally charged settings, more susceptible to peer 
and other outside influences, more impulsive and less future-oriented,” 
factors that are “amplified for those who have experienced trauma.”118 
Following this logic, Schiraldi proposes a system for young adults 
 
 111.  JAMES C. HOWELL ET AL., BULLETIN 5, YOUNG OFFENDERS AND AN 
EFFECTIVE RESPONSE IN THE JUVENILE AND ADULT JUSTICE SYSTEMS: WHAT HAPPENS, 
WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN, AND WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW (STUDY GROUP ON THE 
TRANSITIONS BETWEEN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND ADULT CRIME) 24 (2013), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/242935.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FES-SRJS]. 
 112.  Samantha Buckingham, Reducing Incarceration for Youthful Offenders 
with a Developmental Approach to Sentencing, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 847–49 
(2013). 
 113.  See, e.g., TREATMENT OF YOUNG ADULTS, supra note 68, at ¶¶ 14, 24 
(concluding that young adults 18–25 years old form a “distinct group with needs that 
are different” from children and older adults and calling for a “distinct approach to the 
treatment of young adults in the criminal justice system”); see also Farrington et al., 
supra note 26, at 737–39 (summarizing European treatment of young adults and 
counting 18 countries which treat 18–20-year-olds less severely than older adults). 
 114.  Scott et al., supra note 22, at 643; see also Farrington et al., supra note 
26, at 735 (“All available age-crime curves show that the legal age of adulthood at 
18 . . . is not characterized by a sharp change in offending at exactly that age, and it 
has no specific relevance to the downslope of the age-crime curve.”). 
 115.  Vermont enacted a statute in 2018 which will expand juvenile court 
jurisdiction to include 18-year-olds in 2020 and 19-year-olds in 2022. 2018 Vt. Acts & 
Resolves No. 201, sec. 13, 17 (to be codified at VT. STAT. ANN. § 5201(d)). 
 116.  H.B. 7045, Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2017); H.B. 6191, 99th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2016) (proposing to raise the age for all offenses); H.B. 
6308, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2016) (proposing to raise the age for 
misdemeanors only); S.B. 816, 190th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2017); S.B. 947, 
190th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2017); H.B. 3037, 190th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. 
(Mass. 2017); S.B. 892, 119th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2016). 
 117.  CHESTER & SCHIRALDI, supra note 110, at v. 
 118.  Id. 
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which largely tracks juvenile court procedures—young adult defendants 
should have a juvenile probation officer, and their court records should 
be confidential, for instance.119 More modest proposals include creating 
new “special courts for young adult offenders” that would impose less 
severe punishment than adult courts.120 
Proposals to raise the age of juvenile court jurisdiction are 
controversial, even among scholars who also see a need to change the 
law’s treatment of young adults but question whether enough scientific 
data exists to support treating people up to age 24 as children. Four 
leading scholars—each of whom had some significant influence over the 
application of new social science research regarding children under 
eighteen to juvenile justice law—cautioned that treating young adults 
like teenagers “is premature at best.”121 
Importantly, however, this controversy centers on the degree to 
which we treat young adults like children—not whether we should treat 
young adults differently from older adults. The same scholars who 
opposed raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction above 18 also 
wrote that “[c]hanges in the ways in which we treat young adult 
offenders are long overdue,” and that they should be treated “as a 
special category of offenders in the adult justice system.”122 That idea is 
not limited to academics but is mainstream enough that the U.S. 
Department of Justice (at least under the Obama Administration) 
supported the idea,123 and mainstream organizations like the Council of 
State Governments has described young adults 18–24 years old “as a 
distinct developmental group with heightened impulsive behavior, risk 
taking, and poor decision making,”124 ideas which have found some 
application in some of the reforms discussed above.125 
Scholars have also proposed several mechanisms for what treating 
young adult offenders as a “special category” might entail. A leading 
 
 119.  Id. at 62; see also Farrington et al., supra note 26, at 742 (listing raising 
the age of juvenile court jurisdiction “to age 21 or preferably 24 so that fewer young 
offenders are dealt with in the adult criminal justice system” as one policy option). 
 120.  Farrington et al., supra note 26, at 742.  
 121.  Laurence Steinberg et al., Don’t Treat Young Adults as Teenagers, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/01/opinion/Sunday 
/dont-treat-young-adults-as-teenagers.html. 
 122.  Id; see also Steinberg, supra note 17, at 417 (calling for “an intermediate 
category designated for late adolescents and/or young adults”). 
 123.  Karol V. Mason, Rethinking Our Approach to Young Adults, OFF. OF 
JUST. PROGRAMS: OJP BLOG (Jan. 13, 2017), https://ojp.gov/ojpblog/blog-mason-
young-adults.htm [https://perma.cc/ZRY9-TUP3].  
 124.  REDUCING RECIDIVISM, supra note 1, at 1. 
 125.  Supra notes 73–92 and accompanying text. 
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option is what Barry Feld has called a “youth discount”126—“fractional 
reductions in sentence-lengths” for all youthful offenders based on the 
notion that a young adult offender is less culpable than older 
offenders.127 Under this proposal, age would create a sliding scale of 
punishment; a child tried as an adult could receive no more than a 
fraction of an adult sentence, with the size of that fraction gradually 
increasing until the young adult reached a certain age, at which point 
full adult sentences would become available.128 Legislatures would have 
to set the precise age ranges and fractional amounts,129 but the youth 
discount would categorically apply to all young adults. 
Other reformers propose more case-by-case approaches. Elizabeth 
Scott, Richard Bonnie, and Laurence Steinberg have proposed a set of 
reforms to create a “[d]evelopmental [a]pproach to [y]oung [a]dult 
[o]ffenders.”130 This approach includes expanded youthful offender acts 
and prison facilities built for young adult offenders.131 Regarding the 
length of time young adults spend in prison, they propose a case-by-
case approach intended to reduce the length of time young adults spend 
incarcerated. First, they argue that young adults’ “relative youth should 
be considered at sentencing.”132 Once sentenced, young adult offenders 
should be able to seek parole earlier than older adults “to demonstrate, 
on an expedited basis, that [they] no longer represent[] threat[s] to 
society.”133 In context of their calls for recognizing “young adults as a 
transitional category between juveniles and older adult offenders,”134 
these proposals are intended to spur frequent use to meaningfully 
reduce young adults’ time incarcerated. 
California has enacted a limited version of Scott, Bonnie, and 
Steinberg’s proposal, granting modestly earlier parole eligibility for 
individuals serving long prison sentences for crimes committed before 
the age of 23.135 When considering such parole applications, the parole 
board must “give great weight to the diminished culpability” of the 
individual prisoner “and any subsequent growth and increased 
 
 126.  Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and 
Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 L. & 
INEQ. 263, 264 (2013). 
 127.  HOWELL ET AL., supra note 111, at 28. 
128.  Feld, supra note 126, at 322–23. 
 129.  Id.; Farrington et al., supra note 26, at 743. 
 130.  Scott et al., supra note 22, at 660. 
 131.  Id. at 660–63. These two reforms are discussed infra Section I.B. 
 132.  Id. at 661. 
 133.  Id. at 662. 
 134.  Id. at 644. 
 135.  S.B. 261, 2015–16 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (codified at CAL. PENAL 
CODE §§ 3051 & 4801(c)). 
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maturity” that prisoner can show.136 The statute covers individuals 
serving long sentences, rendering them eligible for parole after 15, 20, 
or 25 years (depending on the severity of their sentence).137 The statute 
thus excludes individuals serving shorter sentences, who, as will be 
discussed infra, contribute significantly to mass incarceration.138 In 
addition, this statute relies on parole boards, which some advocates 
have criticized as routinely denying parole.139 While the impact of this 
statute remains to be seen, one study of an earlier statute which granted 
earlier parole opportunities to individuals sentenced as adults for crimes 
committed as children found that affected individuals were more likely 
to be granted parole and at a younger age than other offenders.140 
Less dramatically, the American Law Institute’s revisions to the 
Model Penal Code would permit state courts, on a case-by-case basis, 
to sentence young adults under 21 like they sentence children under 
18.141 This provision would only be triggered “when substantial 
circumstances establish that this will best effectuate the purposes” of 
sentencing, requiring some individualized determination of those 
facts.142 Other, more limited, sentencing consideration for young adults’ 
age is available, also only on a case-by-case basis. ALI’s scheme would 
permit sentencing judges to treat a young adult’s age as mitigation and 
“[i]n an extraordinary case, a young adult’s developmental deficits may 
even provide grounds for departure from any mandatory penalty . . . or 
might supply the basis for a proportionality ceiling on the severity of 
any punishment.”143 While Scott, Bonnie, and Steinberg’s case-by-case 
approach appears intended to be applied liberally, the ALI’s limiting 
 
 136.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801(c) (West 2018). 
 137.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051(b)(1)–(3) (West 2018). 
 138.  Infra Section II.A. 
 139.  E.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FALSE HOPE: HOW PAROLE SYSTEMS 
FAIL YOUTH SERVING EXTREME SENTENCES 49 (2016), https://www.aclu.org/ 
sites/default/files/field_document/121416-aclu-parolereportonlinesingle.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5MG5-YK5G]; Marc Mauer, A 20-Year Maximum for Prison 
Sentences, DEMOCRACY (2016), http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/39/a-20-year-
maximum-for-prison-sentences/ [https://perma.cc/W37K-NJXC] (asserting that political 
demands to appear tough on crime “have made parole release increasingly difficult to 
secure in many states.”).  
 140.  Beth Caldwell, Creating Meaningful Opportunities for Release: Graham, 
Miller and California’s Youth Offender Parole Hearings, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 245, 272–75 (2016). 
 141.  MODEL PENAL CODE SENTENCING § 6.11A(k) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative 
Draft No. 2, 2011) at 37, https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/publications/model-penal-
code-sentencing-tentative-draft-no-2 [https://perma.cc/F9ZA-CPYY]. 
142.   Id.  
 143.  Id. § 6.11A(b) cmt., at 38. 
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language—“substantial circumstances” and “extraordinary case”—
suggests an intention for conservative application. 
D. Categorical vs. Case-by-Case Approaches 
One of the central points of dispute between proposals for treating 
young adults differently is between the ALI’s call for individualized 
determinations whether young adults’ age should mitigate sentences, 
and Feld and others’ insistence on a categorical approach. Those 
arguing for a categorical approach argue that courts cannot accurately 
determine which young adults are likely to become long-term repeat 
offenders, and that the facts of any specific offense are likely to 
disproportionately sway sentencing judges, compared to defendants’ 
age. In addition to those concerns, this section will argue that 
experience with existing case-by-case approaches and empirical 
evidence regarding the impact of age at sentencing demonstrates the 
weakness of such approaches in implementing changes to young adult 
sentencing—at least as current law structures those approaches. 
1. CATEGORICAL VS. CASE-BY-CASE APPROACHES IN THE SUPREME 
COURT QUARTET 
The Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment quartet incorporates this 
tension between categorical and case-by-case approaches to children’s 
sentencing. Roper and Graham categorically prohibited capital 
punishment and life without parole for non-homicide crimes for 
children, respectively, rejecting arguments that states should be able to 
impose those punishments based on individual case considerations.144 
Echoing scholars who sought a categorical ban on the juvenile death 
penalty,145 the Court held in Roper that a categorical rule was necessary 
because “marked and well understood” differences between children 
and adults exist, because neither psychological experts nor our legal 
system can determine which children exhibit “true depravity” as to 
justify such punishments, and because an unacceptable risk exists that 
the facts of specific crimes would outweigh more general evidence 
about age and development.146 The Court reaffirmed this reasoning in 
Graham, rejecting arguments that case-by-case consideration of 
 
144.  See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77–82 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005). 
 145.  See, e.g., Steinberg & Scott, supra note 21, at 1016 (arguing that a case-
by-case approach “is likely to count as mitigating only when the juvenile otherwise 
presents a sympathetic case or when other irrelevant factors, such as a childlike 
physical appearance, lead others to view the offender as relatively less blameworthy”). 
 146.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 572–73.  
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defendants’ age would suffice; the Court saw little reason to think any 
fact-finder could apply such consideration “with sufficient accuracy.”147 
The Court shifted in Miller v. Alabama,148 declining to prohibit 
juvenile life without parole categorically, and instead prohibiting the 
application of statutes which make life without parole mandatory for 
children.149 The Court thus required states to give some weighty 
consideration to a child’s youth as mitigation before imposing that 
severe sentence.150 
Montgomery v. Louisiana151 represents a partial step back towards 
a categorical approach.152 The Court granted certiorari to determine if 
Miller had adopted a procedural rule—in which case it would not apply 
retroactively—or a new substantive rule that would.153 Declaring Miller 
to be procedural would have been consistent with a case-by-case 
approach—on that understanding, all Miller did was require a state to 
consider a defendant’s age in each individual case before imposing a 
life without parole sentence on a child. But the Court declared Miller to 
be substantive—banning life without parole for “juvenile offenders 
whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth.”154 Moreover, 
while Montgomery did not declare life without parole unconstitutional 
for all children, it nudged states to end such sentences categorically by 
statute.155 
 
 147.  Graham, 560 U.S. at 77–78. 
148.  567 U.S. 460 (2012).  
 149.  Id. Many scholars critiqued this shift. E.g., Mary Berkheiser, 
Developmental Detour: How the Minimalism of Miller v. Alabama Led the Court’s 
“Kids Are Different” Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Down a Blind Alley, 46 AKRON 
L. REV. 489 (2013). 
 150.  Thomas Grisso & Antoinette Kavanaugh, Prospects for Developmental 
Evidence in Juvenile Sentencing Based on Miller v. Alabama, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y 
& L. 235, 235 (2016) (describing Miller as raising the question of whether courts will 
have to apply developmental evidence in individual cases). 
151.  136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).  
152.  Id. at 736.  
 153.  Id. at 727. 
 154.  Id. at 734. 
 155.  The Court noted that states can comply with Miller by offering anyone 
sentenced as a child parole, a step which would eliminate juvenile life without parole 
sentences. Id. at 736. Justice Scalia, in dissent, interpreted the majority as making 
juvenile life without parole sentences “a practical impossibility.” Id. at 744 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). More colorfully, Scalia described the majority’s nudge towards offering 
parole opportunities as “in Godfather fashion, . . . mak[ing] an offer they can’t refuse.” 
Id. 
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2. THE COMPARATIVE BENEFITS OF A CATEGORICAL APPROACH FOR 
YOUNG ADULTS 
Many of the proposals described in Section I.C. involve some 
form of a categorical approach to sentencing; young adults would, by 
virtue of their age, be tried in a specialty court, or benefit from a youth 
discount or other age-specific sentencing, or be committed to an age-
specific facility. But some proposals fall on the other side of the 
spectrum; in particular, the ALI’s proposed Model Penal Code, and its 
relatively narrow path towards finding that a lesser sentence is 
appropriate due to a defendant’s youth, follows a pure case-by-case 
approach. 
The proposals for categorical approaches reflect the policy 
judgment that young adults are generally less culpable than adults, and 
that the best policies avoid the problems of case-by-case analysis, just 
as categorical approaches to juvenile sentencing is needed.156 Similarly, 
following the Court’s discussion in Roper and Graham, many 
commentators have similarly proposed categorical approaches for 
young adult sentencing.157 
Both the limited number of cases addressing claims for youthful 
mitigation for young adults and empirical studies into sentencing more 
generally reveals the weakness of case-by-case approaches—at least 
those case-by-case approaches under existing law. If youthful offenders 
are generally less culpable, less subject to deterrence, and more 
susceptible to rehabilitation than older adults, then they should 
generally receive lesser sentences. Yet, often following narrowly drawn 
statutes, case law shows courts recognizing youth as mitigation only in 
narrow instances, and empirical research shows sentencing judges 
imposing a youth penalty rather than a youth discount. 
a. Case Law Illustrating the Risks of a Case-by-Case Approach 
This section analyzes cases in those state statutes which, like the 
ALI, permit a limited consideration of youth at sentencing. These 
statutes recognize the general idea that age-based mitigation may 
continue past age 18. But in application, these statutes’ case-by-case 
administration reveals that those narrow laws lead to courts 
inadequately weighing the mitigating aspects of age and treat young 
adults whose age distinguishes them from older adults as the exception 
rather than the norm. Either a more categorical approach to young adult 
mitigation or a case-by-case standard that weighs such mitigation more 
 
 156.  Feld, supra note 126, at 316–22. 
 157.  HOWELL ET AL., supra note 111, at 29. 
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heavily is necessary to more effectively and consistently account for 
youth. 
Several cases have reduced young adults’ sentences based on their 
age. In People v. House,158 an Illinois appellate court voided a 
mandatory life without parole sentence imposed on a 19-year-old 
defendant convicted for homicide on an accomplice liability theory, 
applying Eighth Amendment principles from the Roper line of cases.159 
The Illinois court described Roper’s line at age 18 as “somewhat 
arbitrary” given the ongoing brain development past that line.160 This 
defendant “at age 19 years and 2 months, was barely a legal adult and 
still a teenager.”161 Just as Miller required sentencing courts to consider 
age and other mitigating factors before imposing a life without parole 
sentence for children, the Illinois court remanded this 19-year-old’s 
sentence for similar consideration.162 The court emphasized the 
defendant’s lesser role in the crime—acting as a lookout away from the 
scene of the murder, having no role in planning the crime, and 
following “orders from higher ranking [gang] members”163 and various 
challenges in his youth which may have mitigated the crime.164 
State v. O’Dell,165 a 2015 Washington Supreme Court decision, 
also reduced a young adult’s sentence based on his age.166 But that 
holding is heavily dependent on a narrow set of facts. The defendant 
committed the crime at issue ten days after he turned 18, a fact the 
court noted twice.167 The defendant was still in high school,168 and 
presented evidence that he still had legos and a “stuffed kitty that had 
been on his bed since he was born” in his room and otherwise behaved 
as a child.169 These facts were particularly important to mitigating the 
defendant’s crime—sex with a 12-year-old child without the use of 
force. The defense argued that as a high school student, he continued to 
see children of various ages and “was not some mid-twenties man 
hanging out at the local high school or trolling the internet for young 
 
158.   72 N.E.3d 357, 383 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). 
 159.  Id. at 383. 
 160.  Id. at 387. 
 161.  Id. at 388.  
 162.  Id. at 399. 
 163.  Id. at 384. The Court acknowledged he remained criminally responsible 
due to his actions, which included carrying a gun while other gang members kidnapped 
the victim and serving as a lookout. Id. at 383. 
 164.  Id. at 389. 
 165.  358 P.3d 359 (Wash. 2015). 
 166.  Id. at 360. 
 167.  Id. at 360, 366.  
 168.  Id. at 371.  
 169.  Id. at 367. 
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people.”170 Citing the Roper line of cases’ conclusion that youth have 
diminished culpability and Roper’s concession that youthful features do 
not disappear at age 18, the court concluded that age could sometimes 
mitigate culpability and justify a sentence below state guidelines.171 
O’Dell was clear that sentencing courts had to consider youth on a case-
by-case basis,172 thus raising the question of how frequently courts 
would apply an “exceptional”173 below-guidelines sentence for 
defendants other than O’Dell. 
While House and O’Dell are leading examples of reducing young 
adults’ sentences due to their age,174 courts have not widely applied the 
juvenile Eighth Amendment cases to young adults. Subsequent Illinois 
cases have limited House to case-specific factors, especially House’s 
accomplice liability and life without parole sentence.175 Courts in 
several other states have rejected arguments seeking to apply the Roper 
line of cases directly to a young adult defendant.176 
Several other states have statutes similar to the one at issue in 
O’Dell, requiring defendants to establish some narrow unusual 
circumstance. North Carolina lists age as a mitigating factor when it 
“significantly reduced the defendant’s culpability for the offense.”177 
Tennessee lists youth as a mitigating factor when it leads a defendant to 
have “lacked substantial judgment in committing the offense.”178 Alaska 
permits sentences below its guidelines when a “youthful defendant was 
substantially influenced by another person more mature than the 
 
 170.  Id. at 361. The defense also argued that the defendant’s status as a high 
school student was particularly important given the circumstances of the case. The 
defendant was convicted of a sex crime with a twelve-year old-child, and his defense 
was that he was reasonably mistaken about her age based on the child’s declarations. 
Id. at 360–61. 
 171.  Id. at 366. 
 172.  Id. at 366–67. 
 173.  Id. at 368. 
 174.  See, e.g., Scott et al., supra note 22, at 662 (citing People v. House 72 
N.E.3d 357 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)). 
 175.  People v. Thomas, 74 N.E.3d 127, 134–35 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). 
 176.  State v. Hadnot, 2015 WL 3548396, at *5 (La. Ct. App. Jun. 3, 2015) 
(noting 18-year-old defendant “was not a juvenile” and affirming mandatory life 
without parole sentence); State v. Hopkins, 2016 WL 3128776, at *5 (N.M. May 26, 
2016) (“Defendant was twenty-one years old at the time he committed these murders 
and certainly not within the parameters established by Roper.”); People v. Moore, 2015 
Ill. App. (1st) 132826-U, *13 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (declining to apply Roper, Graham, 
or Miller to 19-year-old defendant); United States v. Marshall, 736 F.3d 492, 498 (6th 
Cir. 2013) (“The reasons for according special protections to offenders under 18 cannot 
be used to extend the same protections to offenders over 18.”). 
 177.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(e)(4) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 178.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-113(6) (West 2018). 
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defendant.”179 This statutory provision excludes a common scenario for 
both juvenile and young adult offenses—offenses committed with 
similarly-aged (and similarly immature) peers. 
Cases in all of these states suggest that youth-based mitigation is 
rarely applied for young adult defendants. Washington courts have 
refused to mitigate a sentence of a 23-year-old who, testimony showed, 
had “maturity and academic drive.”180 North Carolina courts have 
required defendants to produce evidence of immaturity beyond their age 
to mitigate a crime.181 Alaska courts refused to reduce the sentence of a 
23-year-old who had committed a crime with two older offenders due to 
his drug problem.182 Tennessee requires evidence beyond chronological 
age to demonstrate that a defendant lacked “substantial judgment.”183 
Other states have similarly refused to reduce offenses by young adults 
based on their age alone.184 It thus appears unlikely that narrow case-
by-case proposals like the ALI’s would lead to dramatic changes in 
young adult sentencing. 
b. Evidence of a Young Adult Penalty 
The above survey of case law suggests that courts have so far 
largely resisted efforts to reduce young adults’ sentences based on their 
age via case-by-case decision-making. Empirical research suggests a 
more disturbing pattern. Although the data regarding the effect of age is 
limited, several studies suggest that sentencing courts use their existing 
discretion to punish young adults more harshly than older adults—
contrary to what developmental research suggests is appropriate. 
 
 179.  ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(d)(4) (2018). 
 180.  State v. Alden, 2016 WL 901027, at *14 n.4 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). 
 181.  State v. Moore, 345 S.E.2d 217, 221 (N.C. 1986). This case was decided 
before Roper but remains good law. 
 182.  Lewis v. State, 769 P.2d 450, 452 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (“the fact that 
Lewis used cocaine while he was released on bail undermines any advantage which he 
might have” based on his age). This case was decided before Roper but remains good 
law. 
 183.  State v. Adams, 45 S.W.3d 46, 60–61 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). This 
case predates Roper. More recent cases affirm trial courts’ refusal to mitigate an 
offender’s actions based on youth. E.g., State v. Gutierrez, 2017 WL 2274644, at *14 
(Tenn. Crim. App. 2017); State v. Martin, 2016 WL 3563661, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. 2016). 
 184.  E.g., State v. Leverett, 44 So. 3d 634, 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) 
(denying 21-year-old’s request for a downward departure due to lack of 
“evidence . . . to show that Leverett suffered from a mental defect which inhibited his 
ability to appreciate the consequences of his offenses”); State v. Williams, 963 So. 2d 
281, 283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (reversing downward departure due to lack of 
evidence beyond 22-year-old defendant’s age). 
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A growing body of work185 has demonstrated that, under current 
law, young adult offenders do not receive any meaningful discount in 
sentencing, contrary to what developmental research suggests they 
should. Several studies show a young adult penalty—where defendants 
in their twenties face the harshest sentences, with adolescent defendants 
receiving more leniency, and older adults facing gradually less severe 
sentences as they age.186 One study shows no benefit to young adults in 
sentencing as compared with older defendants.187 
Some research shows that any effect from a defendant’s age varies 
with defendants’ race and sex. In particular, some studies show that 
young black and Latino men face the most severe sentences.188 In 
particular, young black men face a significant youth penalty compared 
to black men who are 31 and older.189 And racial disparities are the 
widest for young men.190 
This empirical data shows how much reform is needed. If 
sentences took into account the full timeline of human brain 
development, young adults would receive shorter sentences, and older 
(and thus more culpable) offenders would receive more severe 
 
 185.  The effect of a defendant’s age on sentencing has been the focus of less 
study than other demographic factors. Jill K. Doerner & Stephen Demuth, The 
Independent and Joint Effects of Race/Ethnicity, Gender, and Age on Sentencing 
Outcomes in U.S. Federal Courts, 27 JUST. Q. 1, 2 (2010); Barbara A. Koons-Witt et 
al., Gender and Sentencing Outcomes in South Carolina: Examining the Interactions 
with Race, Age, and Offense Type, 25 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 299, 304 (2014); Darrell 
Steffensmeier, Jeffery Ulmer & John Kramer, The Interaction of Race, Gender, and 
Age in Criminal Sentencing: The Punishment Cost of Being Young, Black, and Male, 36 
CRIMINOLOGY 763, 765 (1998). The same point holds for the intersection of age with 
race and sex. Jeffrey S. Nowacki, An Intersectional Approach to Race/Ethnicity, Sex, 
and Age Disparity in Federal Sentencing Outcomes: An Examination of Policy Across 
Time Periods, 17 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 97, 98 (2017), http:// 
journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1748895816642502 [https://perma.cc/RR3Q-
JD2H]. 
 186.  Doerner & Demuth, supra note 185, at 13, 21; Darrel Steffensmeier, 
John Kramer & Jeffery Ulmer, Age Differences in Sentencing, 12 JUST. Q. 583, 595–96 
(1995); Steffensmeier, Ulmer & Kramer, supra note 185, at 777, 786. 
 187.  Koons-Witt et al., supra note 185, at 313. 
 188.  Doerner & Demuth, supra note 185, at 20; Koons-Witt et al., supra note 
185, at 304; Nowacki, supra note 185, at 104–06, 110. 
 189.  Nowacki, supra note 185, at 105–06. 
 190.  Doerner & Demuth, supra note 185, at 20; Steffensmeier, Ulmer & 
Kramer, supra note 185, at 779. The most recent national data also confirm that racial 
disparities in imprisonment are greatest for young adults. Black 18–19 year old males 
are 11.8 times as likely to be in state or federal prisons as similarly-aged white males. 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
PRISONERS IN 2016 13, 15 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8SH5-V334]. Black males 20-24 years old are 7.4 times as likely to 
be imprisoned as white males of that age, and the rate declines below 6.0 for all older 
age groups. Id. at 15. 
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sentences. If a dramatic change to young adult sentencing is to occur, 
more dramatic reforms to sentencing laws are required. 
II. MASS INCARCERATION 
David Garland coined the term “mass incarceration” (and its 
synonym “mass imprisonment”) to define the tremendous scope and 
systematic operation of our criminal justice and prison systems.191 Mass 
incarceration has two central features: “sheer numbers” and “the 
systemic imprisonment of whole groups of the population.”192 The 
number of individuals incarcerated in American prisons and jails grew 
from about 540,000 in 1980 to 2.3 million in 2010.193 Both the absolute 
numbers of incarcerated individuals and the incarceration rate continued 
to increase through the 1990s and 2000s, even as crime rates 
declined.194 A spike of this scale had never before occurred in 
American history, and makes the United States unique 
internationally.195 The American incarceration rate now exceeds the 
incarceration rate in undemocratic nations like Russia and Cuba and is 
four times greater than the rate in advanced European democracies.196 
Racial disparities among those incarcerated are also well 
established, and research has documented how mass incarceration has 
exacerbated those disparities197 and catalogued the individual and 
aggregate community harms of the levels of incarceration among 
blacks, especially young black men, and called for civil rights activism 
 
 191.  David Garland, Introduction: The Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in 
MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1 (David W. Garland ed., 
2001).  
 192.  Id. at 1–2.  
 193.  TODD R. CLEAR & NATASHA A. FROST, THE PUNISHMENT IMPERATIVE: 
THE RISE AND FAILURE OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 18 (2014). 
 194.  John Pfaff provides illustrative graphs, one showing the U.S. 
incarceration rate rising steeply from the late 1970s and peaking in 2008, with a second 
showing crime rates peaking by the 1990s. Pfaff, supra note 37, at 2–3. Pfaff estimates 
that the increasing crime rates of the 1970s and 1980s can account for only half of the 
increase in incarceration over those decades, and crime rates can explain even less of 
the growth in the 1990s and 2000s “as prison populations continued to rise even as 
crime declined.” Id. at 3–4. See also CLEAR & FROST, supra note 193, at 35–36 
(showing the inverse relationship between incarceration and crime rates since 1990). 
 195.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE GROWTH OF 
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 2, 
(Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/18613/the-growth-of-
incarceration-in-the-united-states-exploring-causes. 
 196.  Pfaff, supra note 37 at 18–19. 
 197.  See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 
195, at 94–95 (showing an increase in racial disparities “[n]ot ‘[e]xplained’” by 
variables other than race expanding as incarceration rates increased).  
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to reform mass incarceration.198Those disparities are greatest among 
young adults.199 
Total incarceration numbers peaked in 2008 and have subsequently 
dipped under 2.2 million (a 5.9 percent decrease).200 That decline, 
however, is localized rather than a steady national trend,201 and 
incarceration rates remain incredibly high by historic and international 
comparisons.202 
The mass incarceration literature has generally focused on large 
systems and the collective or aggregate harms imposed. Two leading 
scholars describe the rise of mass incarceration as “an extraordinary 
story of remarkable raw numbers.”203 This literature has grown, and it 
has argued how and why mass incarceration must be reduced,204 as have 
efforts to reduce the number of individuals incarcerated in American 
jails and prisons—especially individuals who have committed less 
severe non-violent crimes. While criticisms of mass incarceration have 
increased in strength and political bipartisanship,205 this literature has 
 
 198.  E.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION 
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 9 (rev. ed. 2012). 
 199.  Supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 200.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 2015, at 2 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/46EK-6NNM]. 
 201.  Each state’s change in prison populations between 2015 to 2016 varied 
from 5.5 percent increase to a 16.9 percent decrease. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSICE, supra note 
190, at 4. See also Barry Krisberg, How Do You Eat an Elephant? Reducing Mass 
Incarceration in California One Small Bite at a Time, 664 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 136, 137 (2016) (noting the decrease of about 40,000 state prisoners in 
California and arguing that “[t]he current national drop in state prisoners is virtually all 
attributable to California”).  
 202.  Scholars have debated whether this dip is the beginning of the end of 
mass incarceration or something much more modest. Compare CLEAR & FROST, supra 
note 193, at 3 (“As we write [in 2014] there are signs—strong signs—that the 
experiment is coming to an end.”), with Pfaff, supra note 37, at 7 (“I believe that 
sizable cuts in the US incarceration rate are possible. But I believe that they will be 
harder to achieve than many hope, and that they will be far more tentative and 
vulnerable to reversal than many expect.”). The state and federal politics of mass 
incarceration reform since the election of President Trump remain unclear. See id. at 
vii–viii (contrasting Trump’s tough-on-crime rhetoric with ongoing reform efforts, 
including in strongly pro-Trump jurisdictions). 
 203.  CLEAR & FROST, supra note 193, at 1. 
 204.  See, e.g., id. at 4–5 (describing evolution in scholarship regarding mass 
incarceration). 
 205. See Carl Takei, From Mass Incarceration to Mass Control, and Back 
Again: How Bipartisan Criminal Justice Reform May Lead to a For-Profit Nightmare, 
20 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CH. 125, 151, 163–68 (2017) (describing “new bipartisan 
consensus that the United States holds too many people in prison” and various 
dimensions of bipartisan advocacy to reduce mass incarceration). 
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not generally focused on young adults and age-based reasons for 
reforming sentencing of young offenders. 
This section will discuss several core causes of the “remarkable 
raw numbers”206 that make up mass incarceration. Those include 
dramatic increases in both the number of individuals imprisoned for 
violent offenses and the length of their imprisonment, and expanded use 
of pre-trial detention. This section will also discuss how the existing 
mass incarceration literature has largely not explored the overlap 
between these trends and young adults sentencing, and thus limiting the 
ability to craft young adult-specific reforms of these trends. 
A. The Challenge of Sentences, Long and Short, for Violent Offenders 
The public discourse surrounding mass incarceration conflicts 
somewhat with the numerical reality of who is imprisoned for what 
crimes. There is significant traction for reduced sentences for 
nonviolent crimes—more diversion programs, more drug court and 
drug treatment, and less severe sentences for these crimes—but not 
necessarily other—are all hallmarks of sentencing reform efforts. 
Bipartisan sentencing reform in South Carolina, enacted in 2010, 
illustrates this trend. The Omnibus Crime Reduction and Sentencing 
Reform Act207 reduced sentences for non-violent offenders and 
reformed probation and parole practices.208 Simultaneously, South 
Carolina increased sentences for some violent crimes.209 This tradeoff 
was a core selling point for advocates of the legislation; as the Pew 
Charitable Trusts put it, “the legislation ensures there is more prison 
space for the state’s violent and career criminals while helping stop the 
 
206   CLEAR & FROST, supra note 193, at 1. 
 207.  Omnibus Crime Reduction and Sentencing Reform Act of 2010, S.C. 
Acts 273 (2010), http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess118_2009-2010/bills/1154.htm 
[https://perma.cc/RLG5-MAKA].  
 208.  Id.; see also Press Release, Pew Ctr. on the States, Pew Applauds South 




 209.  See, e.g., Omnibus Crime Reduction and Sentencing Reform Act of 
2010, S.C. Acts at §§ 3(A), 20, 26 (2010), http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess118_2009-
2010/bills/1154.htm [https://perma.cc/RLG5-MAKA] (increasing sentences for certain 
arson offenses, expanding the list of past crimes which can trigger life without parole 
sentences, and expanding the list of offenses defined as “violent offenses”); PEW CTR. 
ON THE STATES, SOUTH CAROLINA’S PUBLIC SAFETY REFORM: LEGISLATION ENACTS 
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revolving door for lower-risk, non-violent offenders.”210 The results 
have tracked this initial frame—crime rates have continued to fall, and 
the prison population (excluding those in local jails) fell from more than 
25,000 in 2009211 to 20,345 in 2017.212 In particular, South Carolina 
prisons saw far fewer admissions of non-violent offenders.213 But the 
number of incarcerated violent offenders actually increased in the same 
time period,214 as did inmates’ average sentence length.215 While South 
Carolina’s prison population has declined faster than the national 
rate,216 the long sentences imposed on remaining inmates makes further 
dramatic reductions more difficult. And the overall inmate population 
remains quite high—especially compared to the beginning of the prison 
boom when only about 9,000 individuals were incarcerated, less than 
half the current figure.217 
Reforms like South Carolina’s are positive initial steps, but they 
will not on their own end mass incarceration; for that task, we need to 
incarcerate fewer violent offenders and for less long. Ending mass 
incarceration depends on what Todd Clear and James Austin have 
called the “Iron Law of Prison Populations”—the number of prisoners 
depends entirely on “how many people go to prison and how long they 
stay.”218 The iron law requires focusing on violent crime because the 
majority of incarcerated individuals are sentenced for violent crime.219 
 
 210. Pew Ctr. on the States, supra note 208. 
 211.  S.C. SENTENCING REFORM OVERSIGHT COMM., STATUS REPORT (2015), 
https://www.scstatehouse.gov/citizensinterestpage/SentencingReformOversightCommitt
ee/Reports/StatusReportJune2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z67F-GDW2].  
 212.  S.C. DEP’T OF CORR., SENTENCE LENGTH DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL 
INMATE POPULATION AS OF JUNE 30, FISCAL YEARS 2013-2017 (2017), 
http://www.doc.sc.gov/research/InmatePopulationStatsTrend/ASOFTrendSentenceLeng
thDistributionFY13-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/HMG5-JHRL].  
 213.  S.C. SENTENCING REFORM OVERSIGHT COMM., supra note 211. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  The average sentence length increased from thirteen years, two months, 
in 2013 to fourteen years, four months in 2017. S.C. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 212. 
216.  See, e.g., THE PEW CHARITABLE TR., DATA TRENDS: SOUTH CAROLINA 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM (2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/data-
visualizations/infographics/2017/data-trends-south-carolina-criminal-justice-reform.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5N55-9PBT]; Adam Gelb & Phillip Stevenson, U.S. Adult 
Incarceration Rate Declines 13% in 8 Years, PEW (Jan. 12, 2017), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2017/01/12/us-adult-
incarceration-rate-declines-13-percent-in-8-years [https://perma.cc/77R9-6L2K]. 
 217.  S.C. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 212. 
 218.  Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration: 
Implications of the Iron Law of Prison Populations, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 312 
(2009). 
 219.  James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the 
New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 24–25, 45–52 (2012). 
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“[T]he incarceration of people who have been convicted of violent 
offenses explains almost two-thirds of the growth in prison populations 
since 1990.”220 John Pfaff offers the illustration of dramatic (and 
perhaps unrealistic) reductions in people imprisoned for property, 
public order, and drug offenses.221 Even with such reductions in 
incarceration, our incarceration rates would still be more than three 
times as large as it was when the prison boom began,222 because that 
boom centered on violent offenders. 
This growth resulted from both harsher sentences for the most 
severe violent crimes and more frequent and longer sentences for less 
severe crimes. About 300,000 people are now incarcerated for murder, 
manslaughter, or armed robbery, and these individuals face extremely 
long sentences.223 About 160,000 people are now serving life sentences 
or their close equivalent.224 “Truth-in-sentencing” statutes for violent 
crimes—which require individuals to serve a large proportion of their 
sentence, usually 85 percent, before becoming parole-eligible—have 
significantly increased the amount of time individuals spend in prison 
for violent offenses, and thus represent a major contributor to mass 
incarceration.225 
As importantly, mass incarceration results from states’ increased 
use of shorter sentences for violent crimes which would have been tried 
as less severe charges or led to less severe sentences in decades past. 
For instance, from 1980 to 2010, the average sentence in California for 
violent crimes increased more than 10 months to 48.0 months, a 26 
percent increase.226 Nationally, John Pfaff has shown that a large 
proportion of prison population result from individuals incarcerated for 
relatively short periods of time.227 The average sentence nationally for a 
violent crime is 3.2 years.228 Pfaff has shown that a significant cause of 
mass incarceration is the near doubling of felony charges as a 
proportion of all charges—without a corresponding increase in the 
 
 220.  PFAFF, supra note 37, at 11. See also Krisberg, supra note 201, at 138 
(concluding that the sharp rise in incarceration resulted from “a huge shift in the scale 
of punishment, especially for violent offenders and for sex offenders”). 
 221.  PFAFF, supra note 37, at 185.  
 222.  Id.  
 223.  Id. at 187–88. 
 224.  Mauer, supra note 139. 
 225.  CLEAR & FROST, supra note 193, at 86. 
 226.  Krisberg, supra note 201, at 139.  
227.   PFAFF, supra note 37, at 188. 
 228.  Id. The category of violent offenses can include less serious offenses, 
which helps bring the average down. CLEAR & FROST, supra note 193, at 21. All 
categories of crime include offenses with a range of seriousness, and violent crime as a 
category leads to higher average sentences than other crime categories. Id. at 22. 
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severity of crimes committed.229 From 1994 to 2008, the rate of felony 
filings per arrest increased by 37.4 percent230—these are cases that 
would have been filed as misdemeanors or not filed at all in previous 
years. Other reforms had increased the “likelihood that a person 
convicted of a felony offense would be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment.”231 In the same period prison admissions increased 40 
percent, tracking the increased felony filings nearly identically.232 As a 
result, more individuals face some time incarcerated when they may 
have been placed on probation if they faced less severe charges, and 
more individuals serving sentences of several months or several years 
for what are charged as violent crimes. 
Achieving dramatic reductions in mass incarceration—such as the 
bipartisan effort to “Cut 50,” that is, reduce the American prison 
population by half233—thus requires reduced sentences for violent 
crimes.234 Reducing sentences for non-violent offenders may be the 
proverbial low-hanging fruit, but truly reducing mass incarceration 
requires “building ladders to pick the fruit higher up the tree.”235 
Such reform efforts face a severe political challenge, of course—
many people simply do not want to punish violent offenders less. That 
reality creates the “third-rail in criminal justice reform” —focus on 
non-violent, less serious offenders only, and continue or even extend 
existing punishments for violent offenders.236 
B. Pre-Trial Detention, Bail, and Mass Incarceration 
Calls for bail reform have grown increasingly prominent as tools 
to both reduce the number of incarcerated individuals and treat 
defendants more fairly.237 While a full exploration of our current system 
 
 229.  PFAFF, supra note 37, at 127. 
 230.  John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1239, 1250 (2012). 
 231.  CLEAR & FROST, supra note 193, at 82. 
 232.  PFAFF, supra note 37, at 120–52.  
 233.  Our Mission & Work, CUT50, www.cut50.org/mission 
[https://perma.cc/YZ8K-JL6E].  
 234.  E.g., Dana Goldstein, How to Cut the Prison Population by 50 Percent, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 4, 2015), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/03/04/how-to-cut-the-prison-pupulation-by-
50-percent#.0mygAqSA7 [https://perma.cc/YP4X-Z4WB].  
 235.  PFAFF, supra note 37, at 186. 
 236.  Goldstein, supra note 234. See also PFAFF, supra note 37, at 23–24, 186 
(describing such examples in South Carolina and Maryland). 
 237.  E.g., Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and 
Bail, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 21 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), 
http://academyforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/2_Reforming-Criminal-
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and calls to reform it are beyond the scope of this Article, the essential 
argument consists of several related points. 
First, our current bail and bond system has evolved into a system 
which incarcerates hundreds of thousands of individuals pre-trial. 
Prominent reformers assert that 450,000 individuals are jailed pending 
trial on any given day—a significant proportion of the roughly 2.2 
million people incarcerated on any given day.238 Pre-trial detention 
involves a large number of individuals jailed relatively briefly, and thus 
the effects of this detention are more widespread across the population 
than daily incarceration statistics suggest.239 The proportion of releases 
requiring money payments increased at the same time as the number of 
individuals detained pretrial, indicating a temporal link between the two 
issues.240 
Second, the current system determines who is released and who is 
detained as much (if not more) based on defendants’ ability to pay bail 
or bond than on which defendants pose the greatest risk of 
 
Justice_Vol_3_Pretrial-Detention-and-Bail.pdf [https://perma.cc/89VG-FH9P]; Kamala 
D. Harris & Rand Paul, To Shrink Jails, Let’s Reform Bail, N.Y. TIMES, (July 20, 
2017),https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/opinion/kamala-harris-and-rand-paul-lets-
reform-bail.html?r=0; Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo: The Way to a More Just 
New York State, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/opinion/cuomo-prison-reform-new-york.html; 
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION & COLOR OF CHANGE, $ELLING OFF OUR FREEDOM: HOW 
INSURANCE CORPORATIONS HAVE TAKEN OVER OUR BAIL SYSTEM 18 (2017) [hereinafter 
$ELLING OUR FREEDOM], https://www.aclu.org/report/selling-our-freedom-how-
insurance-corporations-have-taken-over-our-bail-system [https://perma.cc/PSZ8-W7X8] 
(linking “[t]he growth of money bail” and “the massive expansion of mass 
incarceration”). 
 238.  This figure is based on the following rough math: There are about 
750,000 individuals in county and city jails on any given day, and about sixty percent 
of them are pre-trial detainees. Alexander Shalom, Bail Reform as a Mass 
Incarceration Reduction Technique, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 921, 922 nn.7–8 (2014). The 
sixty percent figure has been documented in New York State’s county jails, with higher 
numbers reported in New York City. N.Y. STATE COMM’N OF CORRS., NON-NEW YORK 
CITY JAIL POPULATION ANALYSIS OF 10 YEAR Trends: 2008–2017, at 1 (2017), 
http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/jail_pop_y.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X9TR-GAHF]; Cuomo, supra note 237. Between 2010 and 2015, 
average daily populations of unconvicted individuals in local jails have ranged from 
446,000 to 467,500. TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JAIL 
INMATES IN 2015, at 4 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q7AU-B24N].  
 239.  Annual jail admissions are measured in the millions, and have exceeded 
10 million. MINTON & ZHENG, supra note 238, at 3. 
 240.  THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1990-
2004: PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS (2007), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf [https://perma.cc/VND2-KXJX]; 
Marcia Johnson & Luckett Anthony Johnson, Bail: Reforming Policies to Address 
Overcrowded Jails, the Impact of Race on Detention, and Community Revival in Harris 
County, Texas, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 42, 47–49 (2012). 
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reoffending.241 Such concerns echo those raised nearly a century ago by 
Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter.242 Reformers call for greater 
reliance on risk assessments to determine who should be detained and 
seek to detain significantly fewer individuals pre-trial,243 and several 
jurisdictions have adopted or are considering reforms along these 
lines.244 
Third, incarcerating defendants pre-trial contributes to mass 
incarceration by increasing their chances of convictions and the length 
of sentences served.245 Pre-trial detention gives leverage to prosecutors 
to induce a plea that will either let a defendant out of jail immediately 
or lead to the defendant serving less time than the defendant fears he or 
she would spend waiting for trial.246 Such concerns are particularly 
strong for less-severe offenses (including violent offenses); if the 
average sentence for a violent crime is a little more than 36 months,247 
than many defendants would rationally fear that they could be jailed 
pre-trial for as long as they could be imprisoned after trial, if not 
longer. This added leverage can induce defendants to plead guilty even 
when innocent248 or when different negotiation posture could lead to a 
shorter sentence. Jailing unconvicted individuals for timespans which 
approach the length of a likely sentence undermines the presumption of 
innocence.249 
 
 241.  Shalom, supra note 238, at 923. 
 242.  Id. at 924 (quoting and discussing Pound and Frankfurter’s critiques from 
the 1920s). 
 243.  Harris & Paul, supra note 237. Senators Harris and Paul have proposed 
funding federal grants to state and local entities who shift to using risk assessments for 
pre-trial detention decisions. Pretrial Integrity and Safety Act of 2017, S. 1593, 15th 
Cong. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1593 
[https://perma.cc/PUF6-GYZ3]. Alex Shalom describes recommended shifts in New 
Jersey “from a largely ‘resource-based’ system of pretrial release to a ‘risk-based’ 
system of pretrial release.” Shalom, supra note 238, at 926 (citation omitted). Shalom 
suggests a twenty to thirty percent reduction in pre-trial detentions is a fair goal and 
calculates that in one state a thirty percent reduction would translate to a ten percent 
reduction in the total number of individuals incarcerated at any given time. 
 244.  See $ELLING OUR FREEDOM, supra note 237, at 7 (summarizing several 
such reforms and proposed reforms). 
 245.  Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 589 
(2017); Shalom, supra note 238, at 921–22. 
 246.  Charlie Gerstein, Plea Bargaining and the Right to Counsel at Bail 
Hearings, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1513, 1515 (2013).  
 247.  See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 248.  John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually 
Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 173–74 (2014). 
 249.  See Cuomo, supra note 237 (noting the presumption of innocence to 
critique the large numbers of individuals “incarcerated awaiting trial”). 
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Fourth, the status quo money bail system imposes a significant 
financial cost on impoverished defendants and their families.250 When 
defendants cannot pay the full amount of bail imposed, they typically 
pay a portion of that bail to a bail bond company—money that they will 
not recoup, even if they appear for all court dates and even if they are 
exonerated.251 Thus defendants can win their case and still lose 
financially—paying money they can ill-afford and accumulating 
significant debt.252 
C. Hidden in Plain Sight253: How the Mass Incarceration Literature 
Does Not Focus on Offenders’ Age 
Imprisoning young adults is one significant driver of mass 
incarceration.254 Much writing on mass incarceration focuses on how 
young black and Latino men are disproportionately incarcerated.255 But 
the age of offenders is often a muted consideration, and there is less 
focus on how the youth of this disproportionately affected population 
affects their incarceration or might suggest a tool for reducing the 
frequency of incarceration. 
 
250.  $ELLING OUR FREEDOM, supra note 237, at 2.  
251.  Id.  
 252.  Id. at 2, 8–10. 
 253.  Barbara Bennett Woodhouse uses this phrase to describe the absence of 
children from many accounts of American history, including those in which children 
and children’s rights played essential roles. BARBARA BENNETT WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN 
IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE TRAGEDY OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS FROM BEN FRANKLIN TO LIONEL 
TATE 6–7 (2008).  
 254.  Supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 255.  See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 198, at 9 (“One in three young 
African American men will serve time in prison if current trends continue, and in some 
cities more than half of all young adult black men are currently under correctional 
control—in prison or jail, on probation or parole.”); Forman, supra note 219, at 31–32 
(“[M]ass imprisonment encourages the larger society to see a subset of the black 
population—young black men in low-income communities—as potential threats.”); 
Cassia Spohn, Race and Sentencing Disparity, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 169 
(Erik Luna ed. 2017), http://academyforjustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/9_Criminal_Justice_Reform_Vol_4_Race-and-Sentencing-
Disparity.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQJ7-DSCL]; Bruce Western & Christopher 
Wildeman, The Black Family and Mass Incarceration, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 221, 228–29 (2009), http://prisonstudiesproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/west_wild_blackfamincarc20091.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3PA-
HBCE] (noting particularly large incarceration rates for young black men, especially 
those without high school degrees); Joseph E. Kennedy, The Jena Six, Mass 
Incarceration, and the Remoralization of Civil Rights, 44 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 
477, 477 (2009) (describing the criminal justice system as having “produced a 
collective experience for young black men that is wholly different from the rest of 
American society”).  
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Reform efforts similarly focus on categories of offenses rather than 
offenders’ age. The National Research Council of the National 
Academy of Sciences published a book-length examination of mass 
incarceration with a set of recommended reforms that, while generally 
thoughtful, did not address young adults as a distinct group.256 The 
group Academy for Justice published an otherwise comprehensive four-
volume book in 2017 entitled Reforming Criminal Justice addressing a 
range of essential topics, including an entire volume on “Punishment, 
Incarceration, and Release”—but without a chapter addressing young 
adult offenders.257 As a popular example, the Urban Institute developed 
a web tool in 2016 for anyone to project how specific policy reforms in 
specific states would affect those states’ prison populations.258 All of the 
reform options were offense specific—one can project the effect of 
either reducing new admissions or length of stay for violent offenses, 
nonviolent offenses, property offenses, drug offenses, and probation or 
parole revocations.259 There was no focus on offenders’ characteristics. 
Consider also the prominent proposal by Marc Mauer (of the 
Sentencing Project, a leading think tank) to cap virtually all violent 
crime sentences at 20 years.260 Mauer notes the harm to families from 
lifelong incarceration, how life sentences deprive all prisoners (without 
regard to age) “of the chance to turn his or her life around,” and the 
high cost of incarcerating individuals for life, especially given high 
health costs of older prisoners.261 Mauer also notes how young adults 
will generally age out of crime,262 but makes this point after others, and 
does not tailor the proposal to young adult offenders. 
Academic calls for reform in the mass incarceration literature do 
not generally address young adults as a specific category. Leading 
 
 256.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 195, at 343–53. 
 257.  THE ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Erik Luna 
ed. 2017), academyforjustice.org. The publication includes a chapter on juvenile 
justice, but nothing on young adults in the criminal justice system. Barry C. Feld, 
Juvenile Justice, in 1 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 329 (Erik Luna ed., 2017), 
http://academyforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/14_Reforming-Criminal-
Justice_Vol_1_Juvenile-Justice.pdf [https://perma.cc/32TA-S9D6].  
 258.  Ryan King et al., Reducing Mass Incarceration Requires Far-Reaching 
Reforms, URBAN INST. (Aug. 2015), http://webapp.urban.org/reducing-mass-
incarceration [https://perma.cc/79T4-3X3M].  
 259.  Id. 
 260.  Mauer, supra note 139; Dana Goldstein, Too Old to Commit Crime?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/sunday-
review/too-old-to-commit-crime.html?r=0. Mauer’s proposal would permit exceptions 
to the 20-year cap for “unusual cases such as a serial rapist who has not been amenable 
to treatment in prison or a mass murderer.” Mauer, supra note 139. 
 261.  Mauer, supra note 139. 
 262.  Id. 
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reform proposals include repealing mandatory sentences, reducing the 
length of prison stays, expanding efforts to help inmates re-enter 
society and thus reduce recidivism,263 establishing guidelines for 
prosecutors’ charging decisions, and a variety of reforms regarding 
drug crime enforcement and prosecution.264 The proposals are all fair 
proposals, but none addresses young adults in particular. 
Other proposals focus on reducing prosecutors’ power to leverage 
the threat of long prison sentences to induce relatively punitive plea 
bargains.265 Cynthia Alkon, for instance, proposes narrowing definition 
of felony offenses, recategorizing crimes as misdemeanors or less 
serious felonies and eliminating mandatory minimums to reduce the 
sentences which attach to them.266 John Pfaff proposes establishing 
charging guidelines.267 Limiting prosecutors’ power is no doubt crucial 
to reducing mass incarceration. For this Article’s purposes,268 the key 
point is that proposals to check prosecutors’ power have not focused on 
young adult offenders,269 and connecting such proposals to the young 
adult sentencing literature can yield important benefits, as Section 
III.D.1 explores. 
Similarly, efforts to reform pre-trial detention and release 
decisions270 focus on all defendants. Some advocates note particularly 
large racial disparities for relatively younger defendants,271 but do not 
frame the issue as one whose problem or solution connects with age. 
Nonetheless, a discussion of age would be particularly helpful. Juvenile 
court pre-trial detention decisions generally rest not on bail but on 
predictions of defendants’ risk of non-appearance or crime pending 
 
 263.  CLEAR & FROST, supra note 193, at 163–80. 
 264.  ALEXANDER, supra note 198, at 120–39. 
 265.  E.g., Cynthia Alkon, An Overlooked Key to Reversing Mass 
Incarceration: Reforming the Law to Reduce Prosecutorial Power in Plea Bargaining, 
15 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 191 (2015). 
 266.  Id. at 202–05. 
 267.  PFAFF, supra note 37, at 206–16. Pfaff’s proposal will be discussed infra 
Section III.C.2. 
 268.  A full exploration of prosecutors’ role in furthering mass incarceration 
and on checking that role is beyond the scope of this Article.  
 269.  I have offered one proposal for checking prosecutorial authority 
regarding juvenile offenders—shift that authority from elected prosecutor’s offices to 
juvenile justice agencies. Josh Gupta-Kagan, Rethinking Family Court Prosecutors: 
Elected and Agency Prosecutors and Prosecutorial Discretion in Juvenile Delinquency 
and Child Protection Cases, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 743, 743 (2018).  
 270.  Supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 271.  The ACLU has asserted that “Black defendants between 18 and 29 
received higher bail amounts and were less likely to be released on recognizance than 
were white defendants.” $ELLING OUR FREEDOM, supra note 237, at 18. 
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trial, and juvenile reform efforts have focused on improving those 
predictions and thus reducing pre-trial detention.272 
D. Need for Empirical Work Connecting Young Adult Sentencing and 
Mass Incarceration 
The mass incarceration literature has featured a strong empirical 
focus. That focus is to be expected given the field’s goal; mass 
incarceration involves very large numbers of people, and effectively 
reducing those numbers requires a close understanding of the impact of 
different reforms. It is essential to know what category of offenders are 
sentenced to what types of sentences.273 And existing empirical work 
regarding mass incarceration, like mass incarceration literature more 
broadly, frequently leaves out young adults. 
As one illustration, consider a 2013 report on life sentences by the 
Sentencing Project.274 The report begins by noting how the number of 
individuals serving life sentences (both with and without the possibility 
of parole) has increased significantly in recent years, and thus 
represents a growing proportion of our prison population.275 The report 
breaks down the age of individuals sentenced to life into two 
categories—juvenile and adults.276 Following the Supreme Court’s 
Eighth Amendment decisions regarding children under 18, a separate 
category for under 18-year-olds makes obvious sense. But the vast 
majority—about 149,000 out of 159,000 individuals serving life 
sentences, by the Sentencing Project’s count—were sentenced for 
crimes committed as adults, not under 18.277 The message of these 
statistics in the mass incarceration literature is that if we want to reduce 
the mass use of life sentences, we need to look at older individuals. But 
how many of those life sentences are imposed on individuals who were 
under 21 or 25 years of age at the time of their offenses? Those young 
adults may also command a particularly strong moral claim to sentences 
other than life. 
 
 272.  Infra notes 358–363 and accompanying text. 
 273.  Cf. Krisberg, supra note 201, at 139 (“For any jurisdiction, a careful 
assessment of the composition [of] the current state’s prison population is key to 
meaningful reforms.”). 
274.   ASHLEY NELLIS, SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE GOES ON: THE HISTORIC 
RISE IN LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA 1 (2013), http://www.sentencingproject. 
org/publications/life-goes-on-the-historic-rise-in-life-sentences-in-america/ 
[https://perma.cc/RK96-8TCS]. 
 275.  Id. 
 276.  Id. 
 277.  Id. at 11. 
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That report is but one illustration. Other advocacy documents 
regarding mass incarceration also do not focus on young adults in 
particular, listing data for 18–29 year olds, for instance, rather than 
focusing more precisely on young adults under 25 (or even more 
narrowly under 21).278 Academic empirical literature on mass 
incarceration also often does not categorize offenders’ age with 
developmental literature. Many studies on the effect of age on 
sentencing review an age band of all 21–29 year olds, for instance, 
rather than drawing a line at age 25, when human brains generally 
complete development.279 Other leading scholarship cited throughout 
this section does not generally address young adults in particular. 
Government data often do not discuss young adults explicitly. 
Some government agencies reporting data regarding inmates draw lines 
by decades—inmates in their twenties, thirties, forties, etc.—rather than 
counting young adults more precisely. Other reports identify children 
under 18 as the only group reported by age—ignoring young adults as a 
category worth studying in particular.280 Others report some young 
adults but not others.281 Others report young adults separately,282 to 
 
 278.  See, e.g., $ELLING OUR FREEDOM, supra note 237, at 18 (describing 
racial disparities among 18–29-year-olds). 
 279.  See, e.g., Doerner & Demuth, supra note 185, at 15 (listing studied age 
groups). 
 280.  The Bureau of Justice Statistics annual “Jail Inmates” report, for 
instance, counts the juvenile population in jail but no other age ranges. MINTON & 
ZENG, supra note 238, at 3–5. 
 281.  For example, Texas and New York agencies report the total number of 
inmates on a given date, inmates admitted to its custody, and inmates released from its 
custody, and report some young adults, but place older inmates in decade-long age 
bands (i.e. 20–29-year-olds). TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 2015 
STATISTICAL REPORT 8, 20, 36, 
https://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/documents/Statistical_Report_FY2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MMZ6-GMCM]; N.Y. DEP’T OF CORR. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, 
UNDER CUSTODY REPORT: PROFILE OF UNDER CUSTODY POPULATION 4 (2016), 
http://www.doccs.ny.gov/Research/Reports/2016/UnderCustody_Report_2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GVY2-6LLG] (reporting inmates 18–20 years old, those 21–29, and 
those in their 30s, 40s, 50s, and age 60+). 
 282.  California reports the number of 18–19- and 20–24-year-old new inmates 
every year. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CHARACTERISTICS OF FELON NEW 
ADMISSIONS AND PAROLE VIOLATORS RETURNED WITH A NEW TERM: CALENDAR YEAR 
2013, at 17 (2014), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_ 
Information_Services_Branch/Annual/ACHAR1/ACHAR1d2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C8F6-YUVS]. The South Carolina Department of Corrections, for 
instance, reports how many children under seventeen, 17–19-year-olds, and 20–24-
year-olds are admitted to its custody every year, and catalogues the total population 
admitted to its custody under 24 years of age. S.C. DEP’T OF CORR., AGE DISTRIBUTION 
OF INMATES ADMITTED TO SCDC FY 2016, 
http://www.doc.sc.gov/research/Admissions/ADMAgeDistribFY16.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C7AV-M9FA].  
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their credit, but there is certainly no norm for age groups to be 
reported. 
Empirical studies ought to focus on the age of offenders more 
closely. Age bands should reflect not only the existing constitutional 
line Roper drew at 18, but the developmental line drawn at 25, and 
other possible legal lines in between (such as at 21). Such data would 
give a clearer picture of how many inmates are incarcerated for crimes 
committed at young ages. 
III. CONNECTING YOUNG ADULT SENTENCING AND MASS 
INCARCERATION 
As Parts I and II establish, there is a rich body of literature 
regarding the sentencing of adolescents and young adults, and, 
separately, the challenge of mass incarceration. The topics are 
sometimes linked rhetorically—noting especially that prison populations 
have increased through more frequent and lengthier incarceration of 
relatively young people, especially black and Latino men.283 But deeper 
exploration of how the two bodies of literature can inform each other is 
largely lacking.284 
This section connects those two bodies of literature and explains 
the benefits of such a connection. Connecting the two literatures 
strengthens calls in both for less punitive approaches to sentencing 
young adults. The moral case for reducing mass incarceration, and the 
importance of young adult sentencing to that goal, adds urgency to calls 
 
 283.  See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Is Mass Incarceration History?, 95 TEX. L. 
REV. 1077, 1096 (2017) (book review) (describing tactics which “maintain[] 
surveillance and control over young black people, especially men living in segregated 
neighborhoods of concentrated poverty”); Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at 
Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 432, 434 (2013) (noting relative youth of Latino 
and black men who disproportionately make up state prison populations); Lynn 
Adelman, What the Sentencing Commission Ought to Be Doing: Reducing Mass 
Incarceration, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 295, 310 (2013) (“Young men grow up thinking 
prison is a normal part of experience.”); Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: 
Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 
1023, 1030 (2010) (“Serious time behind bars has become overwhelmingly common, a 
destructive rite of passage for many young, disadvantaged nonwhites; it is thus also an 
omnipresent torsion on families and neighborhoods, an implacable pressure on poor 
communities of color.”); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass 
Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (2004) 
(“On any given day, nearly one-third of black men in their twenties are under the 
supervision of the criminal justice system.”). 
 284.  One exception is a recent student note which argues for a restoration of a 
repealed federal law permitting reduced sentences for 18 to 25 year olds as part of 
federal efforts to reverse policies which “contributed to mass incarceration.” Emily 
Graham, Emerging Adults in the Federal System: A Case for Implementing the Federal 
Youth Corrections Act, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 619, 628 (2017). 
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for treating young adults more leniently. The moral case that young 
adult development renders them less culpable than adults who commit 
the same crime helps respond to retributive arguments in favor of 
severe responses to violent crime that have stymied efforts for reform. 
Connecting these bodies of literature also points towards an initial legal 
reform program, outlined in this section, that draws justifications from 
both the young adult and mass incarceration literature. 
A. Arguments Against Long Sentences for Violent Offenses Benefit from 
Consideration of Age 
Connecting the young adult and mass incarceration literatures 
makes one critical point clear: the youth of many violent offenders 
provides a powerful point in the argument for less severe sentences for 
violent offenses youthful offenders commit. The young adult sentencing 
literature establishes that the reasons for punishing such offenders are 
weaker than when adult offenders commit the same offenses. Young 
adult offenders are less culpable, rendering retribution less appropriate. 
Young adults are less subject to deterrence, and more amenable to 
rehabilitation. And young adult offenders are likely to age out of 
crimes, reducing any incapacitation benefits of long sentences.285 
This section builds this argument at the intersection of the young 
adult sentencing and mass incarceration literature. The argument, like 
much of the young adult literature, refers to well-established purposes 
of punishment. This section builds that argument off of key points from 
the mass incarceration literature, especially the importance of sentences 
for violent crimes, including both long sentences for the most severe 
crimes and shorter sentences for less severe crimes, both of which are 
significant drivers of mass incarceration. 
1. RETRIBUTION 
Considering how youth affects the retributive purposes of 
incarceration is important because the mass incarceration literature 
often explicitly avoids retributive arguments. The mass incarceration 
literature has generally taken a more empirical focus,286 and moral 
arguments have focused on the aggregate harms of imprisoning so 
many people, especially so many black people.287 Compelling work 
 
 285.  Infra Section III.A.3. 
 286.  Supra Section II. 
 287.  Michelle Alexander describes mass incarceration “as a stunningly 
comprehensive and well-disguised system of racialized social control that functions in a 
manner strikingly similar to Jim Crow.” ALEXANDER, supra note 198, at 4; see also id. 
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arguing why fewer and shorter sentences for violent crimes would make 
good policy explicitly avoids discussions of retribution because it is 
essentially a moral, not an empirical, question.288 
The young adult sentencing literature adds a moral argument 
explaining why a 20-year-old who commits a violent offense deserves a 
less severe sentence than a 30-year-old, and a less severe sentence than 
our system currently assigns. Different development renders young 
adult offenders less culpable than those whose brains are fully 
developed. Those young adult offenders may be different than children, 
but they remain less culpable than older adults. 
This argument about retribution is particularly important for 
responding to critics of less severe sentences in both the mass 
incarceration and young adult sentencing literatures. In the former, 
calls for limiting long sentences for severe crimes are criticized for 
failing to account for their retributive purposes.289 At a minimum, such 
arguments create a political barrier to limiting long sentences. At a 
maximum, they provide a strong argument that some crimes are so 
severe that the costs of decades-long or lifelong sentences are justified. 
The young adult sentencing literature provides an important response. 
In addition, engaging in a retributive argument counteracts a 
potentially harmful implication of the age-crime curve—legislators, 
judges, or parole boards seeking to incapacitate offenders may be more 
likely to sentence young adults to longer sentences in order to 
incapacitate them during peak crime years, when recidivism rates are 
higher than for older individuals.290 That is, an incapacitation-minded 
judge sentencing a defendant convicted of, say, burglary or aggravated 
assault might sentence a 30-year-old to two years in prison and a 21-
year-old to four years—knowing that the 21-year-old’s likelihood of 
recidivism declines sharply up to age 25.291 Indeed, the revised Model 
 
at 179–80 (describing the metaphorical “birdcage” created by mass incarceration’s 
connection with a variety of other laws and institutions). 
 288.  PFAFF, supra note 37, at 287 n.7. 
 289.  See Goldstein, supra note 260 (criticizing the Sentencing Project’s 
director’s call for a 20-year cap on sentences for violent crimes). 
 290.  Recidivism rates are higher for young adults. E.g., REDUCING 
RECIDIVISM, supra note 1, at 3. The young adult penalty, supra Section I.D.2.b, and 
proposals to permit greater consideration of incapacitation when sentencing young 
adults, infra note 292, illustrate how that fact can lead to longer sentences for young 
adults. 
 291.  For a graph of this decline, see KIDEUK KIM & BRYCE PETERSON, URBAN 
INST., AGING BEHIND BARS: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS OF GRAYING PRISONERS IN THE 
FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM 6 (2014), https://www.urban.org/research/ 
publication/aging-behind-bars-trends-and-implications-graying-prisoners-federal-prison-
system [https://perma.cc/B9YU-54VW] (graphing U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics data 
based on Urban Institute analysis). 
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Penal Code endorses this approach in some circumstances,292 and such 
concerns may explain the young adult penalty discussed above.293 But if 
proportional punishment is the goal, this penalty makes little sense 
because younger offenders deserve less time in prison than the older 
ones. 
Recall data discussed earlier showing reduced sentences for 
adolescents but stiffer sentences for those in their twenties.294 If 
incapacitation concerns were the primary reason for punishing youth, 
teenagers should face longer sentences than young adults so they could 
be incapacitated until after the peak crime-committing years. But the 
reduced sentences assigned to adolescents illustrates a widespread 
acceptance that retributive arguments outweigh incapacitation. But in 
practice, the youth penalty suggests that those two punishment factors 
flip in importance when judges sentence young adults. The 
developmental literature suggests that it should not flip as adolescent 
brains continue to gradually develop until age 25. Young adult 
offenders’ moral claim that they, like teens, are less culpable and 
deserve less severe punishment should trump incapacitation concerns. 
Vindicating that hierarchy of sentencing goals is a key step towards 
reducing sentences imposed on this population, and thus in reducing 
mass incarceration. 
2. DETERRENCE 
Just as the Supreme Court recognized that children under 18 are 
less subject to the deterrent effect of harsh punishments,295 deterrence is 
less effective for young adults. The potential of long sentences is not an 
effective source of general deterrence, “particularly [for] young 
people.”296 Any deterrence will come from increased expectation of 
being caught;297 longer sentences provide “no material deterrent 
 
 292.  The ALI’s revised Model Penal Code, for instance, would permit states 
to give such incapacitation arguments “priority” when “there is a reliable basis for 
belief that the offender presents a high risk of serious violent offending.” MODEL 
PENAL CODE SENTENCING § 6.11A(c) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) at 
36, https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/publications/model-penal-code-sentencing-tentative-
draft-no-2 [https://perma.cc/F9ZA-CPYY]. ALI suggests “validated actuarial-risk-
assessment instruments” could satisfy the “reasonable basis” standard. Id at 40. 
 293.  Supra Section I.D.2.b. 
 294.  Supra notes 187–190 and accompanying text. 
 295.  See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012) (explaining that 
the characteristics which define youth—“their immaturity, recklessness, and 
impetuosity—make them less likely to consider potential punishment”) (citing Graham 
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72 (2010) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005)). 
 296.  PFAFF, supra note 37, at 190.  
 297.  Id. at 193. 
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effect.”298 Specific deterrence is also ineffective; longer sentences do 
not correlate with reduced recidivism, so we should doubt the specific 
deterrence value of longer sentences.299 
Youth and young adult crime is also less subject to deterrence 
because young men are more likely to commit crimes in groups and 
locking up some portion of these young men does not prevent their 
replacement. As Todd R. Clear and James Austin write, “loosely 
formed and intermittently criminally active groups quickly find new 
members when old ones go to prison.”300 
3. INCAPACITATING OR REHABILITATING YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS 
Incapacitation presents the most complicated issue at the 
intersection of young adult sentencing and mass incarceration. The 
criminology literature has long established that most young offenders 
desist from crime as they get older, a principle reflected in age-crime 
curves.301 Peak crime rates occur in the late teens and early twenties, 
depending on the type of offense, and then fall. As one illustration, 
nearly two-thirds of everyone arrested in the United States for robbery 
in one year were under the age of 25.302 Local statistics are similarly 
telling—more than 40 percent of all violent crime reported to the 
Richland County (Columbia, South Carolina) Sheriff’s Department over 
the past five years involves suspects under the age of 25,303 and half of 
all defendants for violent offenses in San Francisco, California are 
 
 298.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 195, at 134–40. See also Daniel 
S. Nagin, Deterrence, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 19, 20–21 (Erik Luna ed., 
2017), http://academyforjustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/2_Criminal_Justice_ReformVol4Deterrence.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PA4V-PCCG] (arguing that “the certainty of apprehension not the 
severity of the ensuing consequences” provides effective deterrence, and that this 
conclusion questions the policy wisdom of long sentences). 
 299.  Clear & Austin, supra note 218, at 310. 
 300.  Id. 
 301.  E.g., PFAFF, supra note 37, at 191. 
 302.  Buckingham, supra note 112, at 817. 
 303.  More than twenty-seven percent of all reported violent crimes had 
suspects between the ages of 18–24. Data is taken from annual Violent Crime by Age 
of Suspect reports from 2011–15. Pro-ACT, RICHLAND CTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, 
http://www.rcsd.net/gen/proact.htm [https://perma.cc/E5RR-ACP5]. Crimes when the 
suspect’s age was listed as “unknown” were excluded from data calculations. The 
author totaled the number of violent crimes for each age group reported over five years 
to reach the reported data. Data tabulations are on file with author. Richland County, 
South Carolina includes Columbia, South Carolina and is the home of the author and 
the author’s academic institution (the University of South Carolina). 
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young adults, who make up only eight percent of the city’s 
population.304 
The basic point that as individuals age, they are less likely to 
commit new crimes is also evident in recidivism data of individuals 
released from prison. A study of parolees from Florida’s prison system 
concluded that a significant decline in recidivism rates appears for 
individuals released after age 25.305 Indeed, Florida authorities found 
that age at release is the third most important variable (out of nineteen 
found to impact recidivism) on parolees’ recidivism rates.306 The ALI’s 
revised Model Penal Code reflects the reality that most young adult 
offenders will desist from crime, noting that “only a tiny fraction 
bec[o]me serious, repeat offenders.”307 
The normal desistence from crime as offenders age leads to two 
important implications for sentencing, though they operate differently 
for long and short sentences. This desistence shows that incapacitation 
concerns do not support long sentences for young offenders because 
most will simply age out of crime. Shorter sentences are more 
complicated—they may provide some short-term incapacitation benefits 
through offenders’ young adult years, but at the cost of inhibiting their 
long-term path towards desistence. 
a. Long Sentences of Young Offenders 
Decades-long or life sentences serve little incapacitation purposes, 
because older individuals are unlikely to reoffend. Understanding the 
natural progression of criminal activity is important because 
“incarceration after the career ends, or when a career is abating, is 
wasted for incapacitation purposes.”308 This is a crucial point in the 
 
 304.  The Documentary: Neurolaw and Order, BBC WORLD SERVICE (2017), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w3cswcll [https://perma.cc/9YN2-PVGM].  
 305.  FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., FLORIDA PRISON RECIDIVISM REPORT: RELEASES 
FROM 2010 TO 2016, at 11 (2018), 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/recidivism/RecidivismReport2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z9PE-C9P]. 
 306.  Id. at 17. 
 307.  MODEL PENAL CODE SENTENCING § 6.11A (AM. LAW INST., Tentative 
Draft No. 2, 2011) at 49, https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/publications/model-penal-
code-sentencing-tentative-draft-no-2 [https://perma.cc/F9ZA-CPYY]. 
 308.  Alex R. Piquero, David P. Farrington & Alfred Blumstein, The Criminal 
Career Paradigm, 30 CRIME & JUSTICE 359, 469 (2003). See also NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, supra note 195, at 337 (“Because recidivism rates decline markedly with 
age, lengthy prison sentences, unless they specifically target very high-rate or 
extremely dangerous offenders, are an inefficient approach to preventing crime by 
incapacitation.”); Michael Millemann et al., Releasing Older Prisoners, 4 REFORMING 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 325 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) http://academyforjustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/15_Criminal_Justice_Reform_Vol_4_Releasing-Older-
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mass incarceration literature, because, as noted above, harsh sentences 
for some of the most severe crimes account for a large proportion of 
incarcerated individuals.309 
The young adult sentencing literature suggests an important 
additional point: long-term incapacitation is more appropriate for older 
offenders who are still committing crimes than it is for young adult 
offenders who are more likely to desist from crime.310 Most young 
offenders age out of offending while those who continue to offend at 
older ages are more likely to continue offending for longer.311 To the 
extent longer sentences for repeat offenders reflects a retributive goal—
that so-called “career criminals” deserve longer sentences because of 
their long-term commitment to crime—retribution is less appropriate for 
younger offenders because we cannot say with any confidence that they 
have committed to a career in crime. 
Relatedly, the young adult sentencing literature helps explain why 
incapacitation offers little justification for long sentences imposed on 
young adults. If it were possible to determine which 21-year-old violent 
offender is likely to repeat such offenses over many years, then it might 
be fair to argue for long sentences to incapacitate such offenders and 
thus prevent their crimes. But we lack the ability to do so. The 
Supreme Court justified its categorical prohibitions on certain severe 
punishments for children in part on the inability to distinguish the rare 
child who may arguably warrant such punishments from the more 
typical child offender who does not.312 Our inability to determine which 
young adults will be the rare ones to not desist from crime similarly 
counsels in favor of categorical limits on long punishments for young 
adult offenders (at least for incapacitation purposes). The mass 
incarceration literature has recognized this point as well.313 
 
Prisoners.pdf [https://perma.cc/HG36-ZT5M] (arguing for expanded release policies for 
older offenders). 
 309.  Supra notes 223–225 and accompanying text. 
 310.  Some have suggested that younger repeat offenders are more deserving of 
long sentences than older repeat offenders because younger offenders have had less 
time to compile their criminal history and thus have committed crimes in a shorter 
period of time. Shawn D. Bushway & Anne Morrison Piehl, The Inextricable Link 
Between Age and Criminal History in Sentencing, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 156, 161–63 
(2007). But this argument ignores younger offenders’ greater likelihood to desist from 
crime and the greater need to incapacitate an older offender who is still committing 
crimes. 
 311.  Piquero, Farrington & Blumstein, supra note 308, at 447. 
 312.  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 77–79 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 573–74 (2005). 
 313.  See, e.g., PFAFF, supra note 37, at 192 (“[Despite] all the ‘big data’ 
advances in predicting human behavior, we still cannot really predict in advance who 
will end up on which paths.”). 
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These points overlap with retributive arguments. Behavior that 
emerges from a developmental state is less morally reprehensible. “For 
almost all [young] people who commit violent crimes, however, 
violence is not a defining trait but a transitory state that they age out of. 
They are not violent people; they are simply going through a violent 
phase.”314 An aggravated assault by a 35-year-old is more blameworthy 
than the same assault by a 22-year-old because the 35-year-old’s 
behavior more likely reflects a longer-term commitment to such crimes; 
the criminal justice system is more justified in labeling the 35-year-old 
as a violent person than the 22-year-old and punishing accordingly. 
b. Shorter Sentences: Incapacitate Young Adults or Help Them Desist 
from Crime? 
Shorter sentences pose a more complicated analysis, because 
incapacitation concerns could justify longer sentences for young adults 
who commit less severe offenses. A Shakespeare character put it this 
way—troublemaking youth should “sleep out” ages “between sixteen 
and three-and-twenty” and thus avoid the “stealing, fighting” and other 
youthful misbehavior which occurs in between.315 Somewhat longer 
sentences for less severe crimes—say, four years instead of two, or six 
or nine months in a local jail instead of probation—could effectively let 
young adults “sleep out” a portion of their peak crime-committing 
years behind bars. The revised Model Penal Code suggests such 
considerations.316 Indeed, a superficial reading of age-crime curves 
suggest some likely short-term benefits of such sentencing. 
The problem with seeking short-term incapacitation of young adult 
offenders is that any short-term benefit comes at the cost of longer-term 
pathways to crime desistence, and the longer-term relationship between 
incarceration and crime is more complicated.317 While re-offending is 
particularly common among young adults, so is desistance from 
crime.318 Sentencing young adults should seek to facilitate such 
desistance rather than impede it. This goal follows Emily Buss’s call to 
consider “how can the law spur or thwart children’s achievement.”319 
 
 314.  PFAFF, supra note 37, at 190–91. 
 315.  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE WINTER’S TALE, act 3, sc. 3, 59–63 (F.N. 
Moorman ed., Methuen & Co. 1963). In this line, a shepherd complains of youthful 
mischief makers. 
 316.  MODEL PENAL CODE SENTENCING § 6.11A(k) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative 
Draft No. 2, 2011) at 37, https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/publications/model-penal-
code-sentencing-tentative-draft-no-2 [https://perma.cc/F9ZA-CPYY]. 
 317.  CLEAR & FROST, supra note 193, at 38–39. 
 318.  Supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 319.  Buss, supra note 54, at 14. 
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Applying that goal to young adult sentencing suggests a need to develop 
sentencing policies that help young adult offenders desist from crime. 
Using somewhat longer sentences to incapacitate young adults until 
their mid or late twenties fails to facilitate their desistance from crime. 
Employment and marriage help lead individuals to desist from crime,320 
and incarcerating young adults “undermine[s] [those] pathways to 
desistence in the longer run once they are released.”321 Incarceration’s 
negative effects on employment is well established,322 and poor 
employment coupled with the stigma of incarceration do not make 
formerly incarcerated young adults proverbial “good catches,”323 
reducing their prospects for stable long-term relationships which can 
lead to desistance.324 Incarceration has particularly damaging effects on 
offenders’ relationship with their children,325 (and 44 percent of young 
adult inmates have children)326 thus harming stable family relationships 
that should help offenders desist from crime. 
Strict child support policies offer one illustration of these harms.327 
When a young non-custodial parent (usually a father) is incarcerated, 
child support obligations often accrue, leaving many individuals with 
 
 320.  FROM JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 4; Ann Cammett, Reflections 
on the Challenge of Inez Moore: Family Integrity in the Wake of Mass Incarceration, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2579, 2582 (2017). 
 321.  PFAFF, supra note 37, at 193. See also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra 
note 195, at 6. 
 322.  Harry J. Holzer, Declining Employment Among Young Black Less-
Educated Men: The Role of Incarceration and Child Support, 24 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & 
MGMT. 329, 346 (2005).  
 323.  June Carbone and Naomi Cahn use the “good catches” metaphor to 
describe the overall decline in the number of young men considered marriageable. JUNE 
CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE 
AMERICAN FAMILY 75–77 (2014). 
 324.  Id. at 72–74. 
 325.  Andrea L. Dennis, Criminal Law as Family Law, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
285, 328–29 (2017); Shani King et al., Cost-Effective Juvenile Justice Reform: Lessons 
from the Just Beginning “Baby Elmo” Teen Parenting Program, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1381, 
1396–404 (2015). 
 326.  LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN 3 
(2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6L2-
UJ27].  
 327.  E.g., Tonya L. Brito, Fathers Behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support 
Policy Toward Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 J. GENDER, 
RACE & JUST. 617, 657–59 (2012); Ann Cammett, Deadbeats, Deadbrokes, and 
Prisoners, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 127, 141–45 (2011) [hereinafter 
Cammett, Deadbeats, Deabrokes, and Prisoners]. Cammett, in particular, has tied 
concerns about such child support policies to mass incarceration. Id. at 153–54; Ann 
Cammett, Expanding Collateral Sanctions: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Child 
Support Enforcement Against Incarcerated Parents, 13 GEO. J ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 
313 (2006). 
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effective tax rates higher than sixty percent.328 Research has found child 
support arrears negatively impact labor force participation of young 
black men,329 leading some to resort to future crime.330 Even when such 
policies do not lead directly to crime, they undermine ex-offenders’ 
economic prospects and thus hinder their path to desistance from crime. 
As the D.C. Court of Appeals euphemistically wrote in 1994, such 
policies have “unintended consequences,” especially “[f]rom the 
standpoint of rehabilitation.”331 
Incarceration can also worsen inmates’ substance abuse or mental 
health conditions, “undermine romantic and family relationships,” and 
damage inmates’ “reputation in the community and in the family.”332 
All of these effects make it more difficult for young ex-offenders to 
find and maintain stable employment and enter stable relationships—key 
factors which encourage desistance from crime. 
Research regarding juvenile sentences supports the insight that 
longer sentences can harm young offenders’ paths to desistence through 
overly punitive punishments. Leading research sponsored by the U.S. 
Department of Justice has demonstrated that longer periods of juvenile 
incarceration do not reduce recidivism, and incarceration may even 
increase recidivism of lower-level adolescent offenders.333 Adolescents 
desisted from crime better when they had more “stability in living 
arrangements and work and school attendance.”334 The bottom line of 
this research is that “incarceration may not be the most appropriate or 
effective option, even for many of the most serious adolescent 
offenders.”335 Any short-term incapacitation benefit from incarceration 
is outweighed by the criminogenic nature of incarceration, including its 
 
 328.  Brito, supra note 327, at 657. 
 329.  Holzer, supra note 322, at 346. Holzer also found that incarceration 
generally “is strongly and negatively associated with” less employment and labor force 
participation, and that child support enforcement including policies described in the text 
exacerbate that impact, especially for 25–34-year-old men—the cohort in which young 
adult offenders soon find themselves. Id. 
 330.  Brito, supra note 327, at 657–59; Cammett, Deadbeats, Deabrokes, and 
Prisoners, supra note 327, at 145. 
 331.  Lewis v. Lewis, 637 A.2d 70, 73 (D.C. 1994). Lewis reversed a trial 
court order imposing ongoing child support while the father was incarcerated. Id. That 
result does not always apply in many states, as the authorities cited supra note 327 
establish. 
 332.  King et al., supra note 325, at 1393. 
 333.  EDWARD P. MULVEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PREVENTION HIGHLIGHTS 
FROM PATHWAYS TO DESISTANCE: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF SERIOUS ADOLESCENT 
OFFENDERS 1–2 (2011). 
 334.  Id. at 3. 
 335.  Id. The research also demonstrated the importance of effective substance 
abuse treatment, which reduced re-offense rates, at least in the short term. Id.  
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interference with establishing stable school and work patterns, and 
adolescents’ moral claim to lesser culpability.336 
The social and developmental status of young adults also suggests 
similar conclusions likely apply to them. A longitudinal study of serious 
adolescent offenders found dramatic psychosocial maturation continues 
through age 22 and more gradual maturation continues until age 25.337 
From a perspective of facilitating young adult offenders’ maturation so 
that they sooner desist from crime, the study’s authors conclude that 
our legal system should avoid interventions that “impede” psychosocial 
maturation and, in particular, note that incarceration “in institutional 
settings that do not facilitate positive development” may exacerbate 
young offenders’ lack of maturity.338 The jails and prisons in which our 
legal system incarcerates many young adult offenders often have limited 
mental health and substance abuse treatment, and vocational 
development and education offerings, and feature high degrees of 
violence.339 As Samantha Buckingham has concluded, “incarceration 
has a uniquely detrimental impact on the specific category of youthful 
offenders.”340 
Evaluations of Colorado’s youthful offender system illustrate these 
points. Colorado expanded that system in 2009 to include individuals 
who were 18 or 19 at the time they committed a serious or violent 
felony and under 21 at the time of sentencing.341 When such individuals 
were incarcerated, the state spent about twice as much on housing them 
as with other inmates to provide a higher staff-to-inmate ratio and a 
range of education and treatment services.342 About half of individuals 
discharged from the youthful offender system had new criminal charges 
filed against them after two years, but less than one-quarter had new 
 
 336.  Buckingham, supra note 112, at 815–16. 
 337.  STEINBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 7. 
 338.  Id. at 9. 
 339.  Buckingham, supra note 112, at 822–23. 
 340.  Id. at 808. 
 341.  MICHELLE LIVENGOOD, COLO. DEP’T OF CORR., YOUTHFUL OFFENDER 
SYSTEM FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 5 (2014). See also Alex A. Stamm, Note, Young Adults 
Are Different, Too: Why and How We Can Create a Better Justice System for Young 
People Age 18 to 25, 95 TEX. L. REV. 72, 80–81 (2017). The average age at intake is 
now 18.8. GERMAINE MIERA ET AL., COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, EVALUATION OF 
THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER SYSTEM (YOS) IN COLORADO 14 (2014), [hereinafter 
EVALUATION OF YOS 2014], http://cjdc.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/YOS-
2014-DCJ-Evaluation.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4ML-8VBT]. 
 342.  COLO. DEP’T OF CORR., COST PER OFFENDER BY FACILITY: FY 2016–17, 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Qrox9ESHsgM8wOhW2U4F1af7qvws6RkC/view (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2018); RICK RAEMISCH, COLO. DEP’T OF CORR., STATISTICAL REPORT 
2014 17 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B8WLSXAb0Mg8N2NyTUpWRUotWFU/view (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2018); LIVENGOOD, supra note 341, at 31. 
724 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
 
felony convictions and only ten percent had a new violent felony 
conviction, figures which “are very encouraging . . . given that most 
YOS offenders were sentenced there for a violent offense, and 
considering the very high need level of the population.”343 
B. The Mass Incarceration Literature Adds Urgency to Young Adult 
Sentencing Reforms 
Many calls for reforming young adult sentencing have been 
tentative, recognizing the need for more research into young adults’ 
development and rehabilitative programs for young adults.344 This 
hesitation is well-placed. But it leads to a dilemma for policy-makers—
waiting for more research means continuing with a system that creates 
moral qualms by overly punishing young adult defendants. The mass 
incarceration literature adds a strong moral imperative to reform young 
adult sentencing.345 If current charging and sentencing practices 
regarding young adults contribute significantly to the moral problem 
that is mass incarceration, then a more aggressive approach might be 
appropriate. 
One of the most concerning features of our criminal justice system 
highlighted by the mass incarceration literature are the gaping racial 
disparities in our criminal justice system. Eliminating those disparities 
has no single solution, but mitigating treatment of young offenders 
should be an important tool. As discussed above, racial disparities are 
greatest for young, black men.346 Commentators have attributed these 
disparities, at least in part, to social views of “young black males as the 
‘dangerous class.’”347 These points lead to two conclusions. First, 
reducing sentences for all young adults could disproportionately benefit 
minority male defendants and thus reduce the immense racial 
disproportionality that features prominently in the mass incarceration 
literature. Second, requiring sentencing judges to consider explicitly 
 
 343.  EVALUATION OF YOS 2014, supra note 341, at 42–43.  
 344.  E.g. Scott et al., supra note 22, at 643–44; Steinberg, supra note 17, at 
416. 
 345.  As Jonathan Simon writes, “[b]ecause mass incarceration is a human 
rights problem, it requires a solution as an urgent priority ahead of the still speculative 
promise of evidence-based penological treatment and improved reentry supervision 
strategies.” Jonathan Simon, Ending Mass Incarceration Is a Moral Imperative, 26 
FED. SENT’G REP. 271, 272 (2014). 
 346.  Supra notes 189–190, and accompanying text. 
 347.  Steffensmeier, Ulmer & Kramer, supra note 185, at 769. 
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that defendants’ youth might mitigate offenses could counteract implicit 
biases that may contribute to racial disparities.348 
C. Steps for Putting the Connection into Practice 
Reducing mass incarceration depends on reducing both the number 
of people incarcerated and the length of incarceration. Both prongs 
apply to young adult offenders. This section will outline initial ideas 
how that may happen regarding young adults detained pre-trial, 
sentenced for minor and mid-level offenses, and those sentenced to long 
terms for more severe offenses. While none of these proposals would 
prescribe specific decisions in individual cases, these ideas either call 
for categorical reforms—that is, different procedures or standards to be 
applied to young adult offenders on the basis of their age—or standards 
to apply to case-by-case adjudication that require stronger consideration 
of youth than existing law, and more than in the few states which 
permit narrow age-based mitigation.349 This section will also explain 
how the connection between the young adult sentencing and mass 
incarceration literatures strengthen the justification for each proposal. 
1. BAIL REFORM 
Calls for bail reform have grown increasingly prominent as tools 
to both reduce the number of incarcerated individuals and to treat those 
accused of crimes more fairly.350 While these calls can apply generally 
regardless of defendants’ age, they are particularly apt for young adult 
defendants, for whom pre-trial detention decisions should track juvenile 
court norms, focusing on documented flight or re-offense risks rather 
than ability to pay. They are also particularly apt for young adult 
defendants because they are particularly over-represented in local 
jails—representing 28 percent of the jail population, compared with 21 
percent of prison admissions and 10 percent of the general 
population.351 
 
 348.  Such an effect would require reframing rules governing age-based 
mitigation for young adults; rather than asking why one particular young offender is so 
exceptional as to warrant a reduced sentence, the law should start with the presumption 
that a young adult is less culpable, absent evidence to the contrary. 
 349.  Supra Section I.D.2. 
 350.  Supra Section II.B.  
 351.  JUSTICE POLICY INST., IMPROVING APPROACHES TO SERVING YOUNG 
ADULTS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 5 (2016) [hereinafter IMPROVING APPROACHES], 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/jpi_young_adults_final.p
df [https://perma.cc/T6WR-RWJD].  
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Jailing young adults is particularly risky. Even short-term 
incarceration can undermine employment prospects and thus young 
adults’ paths to desist from crime. Moreover, young adults are over-
represented among individuals placed in solitary confinement in local 
jails,352 so they face a particularly high risk that a temporary stint in jail 
will lead to particularly severe harms. Indeed, one of the most 
prominent examples used to support bail reform involves a young 
defendant, Kalief Browder. Charged at age 16 as an adult353 in New 
York with petty theft, the local judge set his bail at $3,000. The low 
bail amount suggests Browder presented a relatively low risk. But, 
unable to pay bail, Browder spent three years awaiting trial, much of 
that in solitary confinement. Eventually released (he never faced trial), 
Browder later committed suicide in 2015, at the age of 22.354 Browder’s 
story illustrates both how money bail and bond can unnecessarily jail 
impoverished young adults and how it can have severe and tragic 
consequences. 
The current money bail system also imposes collateral 
consequences that hit young adults particularly hard. Even when young 
adults can pay bail, they often do so by paying significant non-
recoverable costs to bail bond companies or obligating themselves to 
lasting payments to these companies.355 For defendants who have 
committed crimes, such financial burdens may make the ability to 
become financially self-sufficient—or even to take care of family 
members—more difficult and thus impose additional obstacles to 
desistence from crime. 
More fundamentally, determining who is incarcerated and who is 
released pending trial based on their ability to pay bail prevents courts 
from making decisions based on more important considerations. Setting 
bail or bond does not protect against a defendant committing crimes 
pre-trial, if the defendant or his family can pay. Conversely, a young 
man like Kalief Browder did not pose a greater risk because he and his 
family could not pay a modest bail. 
 
 352.  Nagib, supra note 88, at 2918–19. 
 353.  At the time, New York law considered all 16 year olds adults for criminal 
justice purposes. New York has since enacted legislation to raise the age of juvenile 
court jurisdiction to include 16- and 17-year-olds. 2017 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 59, pt. 
WWW § 106(b), (codified at N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 301.2 (2018)).  
 354.  Michael Schwirtz & Michael Winerip, Kalief Browder, Held at Rikers 
Island for 3 Years Without Trial, Commits Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/nyregion/kalief-browder-held-at-rikers-island-
for-3-years-without-trial-commits-suicide.html. For an example of the use of Browder’s 
case to support bail reform, see Harris & Paul, supra note 237. 
 355.  $ELLING OUR FREEDOM, supra note 237, at 2–3. 
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A core proposed reform is to rely more on risk assessments rather 
than defendants’ ability to pay money bail.356 Though the mass 
incarceration literature does not describe it this way,357 this reform 
would make adult pre-trial detention decisions more like juvenile court 
pre-trial detention decisions. The crucial point is that while in adult 
systems pre-trial detention depends on defendants’ ability to pay bail, 
juvenile courts generally only detain children accused of crimes as a 
means to prevent further crimes.358 Most states require a finding that a 
child poses a significant flight risk or threat to the public through likely 
future crimes.359 The Supreme Court has noted relevant factors to such 
findings,360 and many states limit pre-trial detention to situations when 
no other steps can effectively mitigate the risk of flight or future 
crimes.361 Long-running efforts to improve juvenile court detention 
decision-making—and thereby reduce the number of detained children—
have focused on improving the use of risk assessment tools.362 
Adding this juvenile justice analogy would strengthen calls for bail 
reform, especially for young adults, for whom many of the juvenile 
justice concerns are appropriate. Such a connection is generally lacking 
from both the young adult and mass incarceration literatures.363 Such 
analysis would prevent unnecessary pre-trial detention in cases like 
 
 356.  See, e.g., id. at 7, 10; see also 3DaysCount™ for State-Level Change, 
PRETRIAL JUST. INST., https://www.pretrial.org/what-we-do/plan-and-
implement/3dayscount-for-state-level-change/ [https://perma.cc/BNS7-XC9T]; 
Kentucky Joins National Movement to Improve Pretrial Justice, PRETRIAL JUST. INST., 
https://www.pretrial.org/kentucky-joins-national-movement-to-improve-pretrial-justice/ 
[https://perma.cc/KFA5-DATA] (noting efforts in Kentucky and New Jersey to use risk 
assessments rather than bail).  
 357.  E.g., Kentucky Joins National Movement to Improve Pretrial Justice, 
supra note 356. 
 358.  RANDY HERTZ ET AL., TRIAL MANUAL FOR DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN 
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CASES 72 (2015), http://njdc.info/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/Hertz-Trial-Manual-Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/QD67-
7365]. 
 359.  Id. at 75. 
 360.  Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 279 (1984). 
 361.  HERTZ ET AL., supra note 358, at 75–76. 
 362.  ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., JDAI AT 25: JUVENILE DETENTION 
ALTERNATIVES INITIATIVE: INSIGHTS FROM THE ANNUAL RESULTS REPORTS (2017), 
http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-jdaiat25-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/RSN2-
BU39] (summarizing 25 years of efforts to reduce juvenile pre-trial detention and 
results of those efforts).  
 363.  Alex Shalom connects juvenile pre-trial decision to adult pre-trial 
decisions in a different way. He notes successful efforts to reduce juvenile pre-trial 
detention were linked with reductions in post-trial juvenile incarceration, and suggests 
that this link shows how reducing the adult pre-trial population could reduce the number 
of later-incarcerated individuals. Shalom, supra note 238, at 928–29. 
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Browder’s. Relatedly, any jurisdiction looking to pilot bail reforms 
with a particular population could do so with young adults. 
Despite the general applicability of these reforms, attention is 
necessary to how pre-trial detention decisions are applied to young 
adults. Just as young adult offenders have higher recidivism rates—
strengthening calls for incapacitation of such offenders—some data 
suggests that young adult defendants have higher rates of re-offending 
while released pending trial.364 But even when risks of re-offending or 
flight are heightened, courts should balance any such risks with the risk 
that pre-trial detention could disrupt a young adult’s efforts to obtain or 
maintain employment and maintain family connections and thus remain 
crime-free. The result should be that courts detain young adults pre-
trial only in limited circumstances, and less frequently than current bail 
and bond practices permit. 
2. REDUCED INCARCERATION THROUGH AGE-BASED CHARGING 
GUIDELINES 
As discussed in Section II.A, more frequently incarcerating 
individuals convicted of a variety of crimes for relatively short periods 
of time (several months through several years) is a significant driver of 
mass incarceration. This phenomenon has a particularly significant 
impact on young adult offenders. Young adults are slightly 
overrepresented in prisons, but much more dramatically 
overrepresented in local jails, which house individuals serving short 
sentences,365 confirming that many young adults pass through local jails 
for relatively brief periods of time. 
Connecting the mass incarceration and young adult literatures can 
lead to a more nuanced reform proposal. Pfaff identified increasingly 
punitive prosecutorial charging decisions as a prime driver of mass 
incarceration,366 and proposes charging guidelines to structure and 
reduce the severity of those decisions.367 Such guidelines should be 
 
 364.  COHEN & REAVES, supra note 240, at 1. 
 365.  The Justice Policy Institute studied several large metropolitan areas and 
found large disproportionalities between the percentage of young adults in the general 
population and the percentage in local jails. In Cook County, Illinois (Chicago), 9 
percent of all people, but 29 percent of people admitted to the Cook County jail were 
18–24. In Maricopa County, Arizona (Phoenix), the figures were 4.8 and 25 percent, 
and in Washington, D.C., the figures were 12.7 and 38.2 percent, respectively. 
IMPROVING APPROACHES, supra note 351, at 5–7. These disproportionalities are larger 
than those in state prison systems. Id. at 5 (noting 2002 study showing 28.1 percent of 
jail population was 18–24-years-old, and presenting graph comparing young adult 
prison and jail populations, respectively, to their overall percentage of the population).  
 366.  Supra notes 228–232 and accompanying text. 
 367.  PFAFF, supra note 37, at 212–13. 
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particularly appealing when it comes to age. Some leading young adult 
sentencing scholars do not focus on prosecutorial discretion.368 In 
contrast, reforms in Britain have addressed young adult defendants’ age 
in charging decisions; the Crown Prosecution Service has amended its 
Code of Conduct for Crown Prosecutors to require prosecutors to 
consider a suspect’s “age or maturity as part of the public interest 
test.”369 This consideration appears to be fairly narrow and case-
specific,370 and thus vulnerable to the same criticisms discussed above 
for narrow and case-specific age mitigation provisions.371 But it 
nonetheless represents precedent for considering defendants’ age as 
reasons to decline prosecution or to file less severe charges. Consistent 
with that view, scholars in the young adult sentencing literature have 
also focused on keeping many young adults out of the existing criminal 
justice system. Samantha Buckingham has proposed a set of diversion 
programs open to a wide range of young adult offenders.372 As she 
argues, “incarceration has a uniquely detrimental impact on the specific 
category of youthful offenders,” who Buckingham “proposes to redirect 
to community-based sentences.”373 The expanding list of young adult-
specific diversion programs374 reflects a growing willingness of some 
prosecutors to consider age. 
What has not yet been developed are a set of prosecution standards 
that reduce the frequency of felony filings against young adults through 
consistent recognition that young adult offenders are less culpable and 
more subject to rehabilitation than older offenders. Such a rule could 
require prosecutors, absent unusual circumstances, to choose less 
severe charges when the facts of a case might warrant multiple 
charges.375 Such a rule would also mitigate the risk that authorities 
would view any young adult rehabilitative services as so helpful as to 
create a net-widening problem.376 Charging guidelines could also 
 
 368.  Scott, Boddie, and Steinberg, for instance, propose expanded youthful 
offender status, reformed sentencing and parole policies for young adults, and separate 
young adult correctional facilities, but nothing regarding the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion. Scott et al., supra note 22, at 660–64. 
 369.  TREATMENT OF YOUNG ADULTS, supra note 68, ¶ 69. 
 370.  See id. (noting a leading prosecutor’s view that maturity is only relevant 
when a suspect is “extremely immature” and another group’s conclusion that 
prosecutors take age and maturity into account inconsistently). 
 371.  Supra Section I.D.1. 
 372.  Buckingham, supra note 112, at 866. 
 373.  Id. at 808–09. 
 374.  Supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text. 
 375.  Enforcing such a rule is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 376.  See supra note 93 and accompanying text (noting concern that expanded 
young adult rehabilitative programs could lead to prosecutions of young adults to access 
such programs). 
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require consideration of youthful offender statutes or young-adult 
specific rehabilitation options. 
3. FEWER AND SHORTER SENTENCES THROUGH AGE-BASED 
SENTENCING STATUTES 
The young adult sentencing literature has identified several 
proposals which, if taken to scale, would significantly reduce overall 
sentence lengths for young adults and increase rehabilitative programs 
for them. Barry Feld’s proposal for a youth discount377 could 
significantly reduce sentences for young adults, though it would not, on 
its own, expand rehabilitative programming. Recognizing the lesser 
culpability of still-developing young adults, it would give a reduced 
sentence based on age. Reflecting the gradual maturation process, it 
would provide decreasing benefit to young adults as they age—a 20-
year-old might get a 25 percent reduction off an adult sentence while a 
24-year-old might only get 5 or 10 percent reduction.378 Such 
sentencing standards could provide a useful means of reducing 
sentences. 
Another method to achieve the same goal, while also increasing 
the provision of rehabilitative services is to expand youthful offender 
statutes. Such statutes provide sentencing judges with the opportunity to 
both reduce or eliminate jail or prison sentences for young adults and 
require sentencing young adults to probation when older offenders 
would get prison time, or to shorter prison sentences or to sentences in 
young adult-specific facilities. State legislatures should expand these 
statutes and render them applicable to all young adult offenders379 
unless judges find that the defendant is unusually mature for his or her 
age. Similarly, Emily Graham proposed resurrecting the federal Youth 
Corrections Act.380 That statute, repealed in 1984,381 permitted federal 
judges to sentence 18–21 year old defendants to probation or to 
specialized young adult programs.382 Similar statutes could lead to 
widely applied sentence reductions and greater use of rehabilitative 
 
 377.  Supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text. 
 378.  Legislatures would have to set the precise age range and percent 
reductions. Supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 379.  Legislatures would have to engage in the difficult task of drawing lines 
defining this category. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
380.   Graham, supra note 284, at 634.  
 381.  Pub. L. 98-473, tit. II, § 218(a), 98 Stat. 2027 (1984). 
 382.  18 U.S.C. 5006(d), 5010 (repealed 1984). Graham described these 
provisions, as interpreted by caselaw, as establishing a presumption of applicability to 
“individuals aged eighteen through twenty-two.” Graham, supra note 284, at 628. 
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programs; lower level young adult offenders would avoid incarceration 
and more severe offenders would be sentenced to less time. 
Less ambitious reforms would seek to revise existing sentencing 
statutes to permit more meaningful case-by-case consideration of 
whether a young adult’s age mitigates his or her offense. Cases 
described above show that young adult status can mitigate an offense 
only in particularly narrow circumstances.383 These cases look for 
exceptional young adults—those who are dramatically different from 
other young adults. Instead, the law should permit youth to mitigate 
offenses when defendants exhibit features which correlate with the 
“hallmark features” of young adulthood,384 because those normal 
features render young adults less culpable than older adults. The burden 
should be placed on the state to prove why young adults should receive 
the same sentence as older adults.385 
4. EARLIER PAROLE ELIGIBILITY FOR YOUNG ADULT OFFENDERS 
When young adults are sentenced to prison, their relative youth 
should lead to generally shorter sentences, and earlier access to parole. 
With young adults accounting for about forty percent of all people 
arrested for murder, non-negligent manslaughter, and robbery386—and 
thus likely disproportionately serving long sentences associated with 
those crimes which contribute significantly to mass incarceration—
analyzing how the criminal justice system sentences young adults for 
such crimes is particularly important. The young adult sentencing 
literature and related reform efforts—especially California’s enactment 
of early parole eligibility for individuals incarcerated for crimes 
committed before age 23 discussed in Section I.c—have begun to seek 
this goal. But evaluating those efforts in light of the mass incarceration 
literature shows how much stronger those reform efforts must become. 
California’s early parole statute is a positive step, but too modest 
to address the problem fully. First, that statue is limited to individuals 
serving long sentences; depending on the sentence being served, 
individuals are eligible for parole after 15, 20, or 25 years.387 To state 
the obvious, that only provides early parole eligibility for those serving 
very long sentences. As discussed in Section II.A, however, the mass 
 
 383.  Supra Section I.D.1. 
 384.  Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477 (2012). 
 385.  This proposal adds strength to Scott, Bonnie and Steinberg’s conclusion 
that young adults’ “relative youth should be considered in sentencing,” but without 
proposing how, or under what standard, such consideration should occur. Supra note 
132 and accompanying text. 
 386.  REDUCING RECIDIVISM, supra note 1, at 2. 
 387.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051(b) (West 2018). 
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incarceration literature demonstrates that most prisoners, including 
those serving sentences for violent crime, serve much shorter sentences 
and that an increase in such shorter sentences for violent crimes is a 
prime driver of mass incarceration.388 The California young adult parole 
reforms do nothing to make young adults serving 2, 5, or 10 year 
sentences eligible for parole earlier. 
Second, comparing the California early parole statute to proposals 
from the mass incarceration literature demonstrates the statute’s limits. 
That law requires the parole board to “give great weight” to inmates’ 
youth at the time of their crimes.389 But the parole board must still 
balance that consideration with an examination of the “gravity” of the 
individuals’ offense and whether “public safety requires a more lengthy 
period of incarceration.”390 This balancing risks tension with Roper and 
Graham’s insistence that the brutal facts of any specific crime not 
receive undue weight in comparison to an individual’s age at the time of 
an offense.391 The mass incarceration literature has led to more far 
reaching proposals; John Pfaff has proposed a blanket early release of 
inmates who are over 40 and who have served 15 or more years of their 
sentence.392 
Pfaff suggests this proposal is “more politically palatable than a 
bigger change” and a way to address political opposition to less severe 
sentencing of violent offenders, as is necessary to address mass 
incarceration.393 An even more politically palatable approach would 
focus on young adult offenders. The recent success of efforts to 
prohibit firearm sales to young adults under 21 in the midst of political 
opposition from gun rights proponents394 suggests a possible political 
path for sentencing reform as well. An individual who has likely 
outgrown youthful violence is less worthy of long punishment than a 
forty-five year old who committed his most recent violent offense at 
age 30. Pfaff’s proposal hints at a young adult focus; a forty year old 
who has served at least fifteen years of a sentence committed his crime 
when he was a young adult.395 Making that connection more explicit 
 
 388.  Supra notes 228–232 and accompanying text. 
 389.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801(c) (West 2018). 
 390.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041(b)(1) (West 2018). This provision is explicitly 
made applicable to youth offender parole hearings. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051(d) (West 
2018). 
 391.  Supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text. 
 392.  PFAFF, supra note 37, at 230. 
 393.  Id. 
 394.  See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
395.   PFAFF, supra note 37, at 230. 
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could increase both the political viability and proportionality of any 
reform proposal.396 
A strong young-adult focused reform would provide for early 
parole eligibility for all young adult sentences. The California young 
adult parole reforms only modestly expedites parole eligibility. An 
individual serving a life sentence less than twenty-five years to life is 
eligible for parole after serving twenty years.397 Todd Clear and 
Natasha Frost note that prior to “truth-in-sentencing” laws, individuals 
were often parole eligible after serving about one-third of their 
sentences, and advocate for repealing truth-in-sentencing laws and 
returning to early parole eligibility.398 The mass incarceration literature 
thus illustrates the need to go significantly further than existing young 
adult sentencing reforms have gone. And the young adult literature 
demonstrates that inmates who committed crimes as young adults have 
a particularly strong claim to earlier parole eligibility, under a proposal 
like Clear and Frost’s. A state unwilling to repeal or reform truth-in-
sentencing laws entirely should consider focusing such reforms on 
young adults. Similarly, states could take age into account when 
crafting good-time credits; young adults might get more good time 
credit for the same period of good behavior than older adult inmates. 
D. Next Steps for Research 
Connecting mass incarceration and young adult sentencing 
literature helps identify areas where further research is essential. First, 
the young adult literature has called for more research to identify 
effective programs at rehabilitating young adults by addressing their 
particular needs for assistance in obtaining education and employment 
records which will help them desist from crime.399 Considering the 
connection with mass incarceration strengthens these calls. To 
dramatically reduce the number of young adults prosecuted and 
 
 396.  In addition, Pfaff proposes a gradual expansion of his proposal—tracking 
recidivism rates and, if they are reasonable, lowering the age line from 40 to 39, or the 
sentence length from 15 to 14 years. PFAFF, supra note 37, at 230. The same approach 
could be used for youth offender releases—it could start, as California did, with 
individuals who committed their crimes before age 25, and could subsequently raise 
that age, or decrease the amount of time required to spend in prison. 
 397.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051(b)(2) (West 2018). 
 398.  CLEAR & FROST, supra note 193, at 86. 
 399.  See, e.g., Scott et al., supra note 22, at 660 (noting that identifying 
effective programs is “an ongoing project” and that “few programs have been 
evaluated”); REDUCING RECIDIVISM, supra note 1, at 3–5 (describing dearth of research 
on programs to address core needs of young adults who commit crimes). 
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punished for felonies, we ought to have a stable of effective diversion 
and probation programs for them. 
Second, it is important to study young adults in particular in 
criminology and sentencing studies, as articulated in Section II.C 
above. Basic data about those who are incarcerated is essential—how 
many are incarcerated for crimes committed as young adults, for how 
long are those individuals sentenced, and what impact would reforms to 
young adult sentencing have on incarceration figures. At a minimum, 
such reforms would help reduce mass incarceration “[o]ne [s]mall [b]ite 
at a [t]ime.”400 At a maximum, given the close connection between 
detention of young adults and mass incarceration, such studies could 
identify a very powerful lever of change. 
CONCLUSION 
Two significant reform programs and bodies of academic literature 
have developed, both with the independent capability to change the 
administration of criminal justice dramatically, and both with 
significant social science, legal, and moral claims behind them. These 
two reform programs—efforts to sentence young adults in a manner that 
reflects their transitional status between childhood and adulthood, and 
efforts to reform charging and sentencing practices leading to mass 
incarceration—deserve to be connected. Such reforms can have a 
significant impact on overall incarceration trends, because young adults 
commit a disproportionate number of crimes, including violent 
crimes.401 Connecting the two reform programs helps strengthen 
arguments for both—adding important arguments to help achieve 
necessary reforms to sentencing individuals who commit violent crimes, 
and adding urgency to calls for reforming young adult sentencing and 
responding to arguments to keep young adult offenders incarcerated 
until their mid-twenties. 
 
 400.  Krisberg, supra note 201, at 136. 
 401.  E.g. supra notes 301–304 and accompanying text. 
